Primo de Rivera and Spain's Moroccan Problem, 1923-27

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General Miguel Primo de Rivera inherited a number of problems when he toppled the constitutional regime on 13 September 1923. One of the more urgent of these was Morocco. Despite Santiago Alba’s efforts to give the Protectorate a civil orientation and to bring the Riffi Rebel, Abd-el-Krim, to the conference table, the constitutional politicians were no closer to solving what had become a major drain on Spain’s manpower and resources in 1923 than they had been in 1921. Abd-el-Krim was intractable, and even Alba’s offer of a partial withdrawal to the coast and the guarantee of Riff autonomy did little to soften his attitude.\(^1\)

Abd-el-Krim had, after all, routed the Spanish Army at Annual in July 1921 and had become, both to himself and a few European and Maghrebi intellectuals and radicals, a symbol of indigenous nationalism. To have accepted Alba’s terms would have meant surrender — or at least partial surrender — to the very people he had almost defeated two years before. This he would not accept. But, of course, why should he? In the autumn of 1923 he was in an ideal position. He led a tightly knit movement that rested on the twin pillars of a centralized political organization and a strong, mobile army. In addition, he fought for a cause: the independence of his people from European and Christian domination. More importantly, he fought on his own terms, and in a territory with which both he and his barkas were intimately acquainted. He could count, moreover, on Spanish war-weariness and French neutrality.\(^2\) There was little reason for him, at least in the short run, even to consider a modus vivendi with the Spanish.

Abd-el-Krim, however, was not the only one who looked askance at Alba’s efforts. The africanistas — those young officers in the Spanish Army who had actually fought in the Protectorate — were appalled by
the Government’s Moroccan programme. They were especially critical of Alba’s attempts to ‘civilianize’ the Zone. The repatriation of the Annual prisoners in January 1923 for 4,270,000 pesetas and the installation of Luis Silvela as the first civilian High Commissioner in February particularly annoyed them. Any attempt by the Government to withdraw partially to the coast would probably have met with concerted opposition from the africanistas. But due to Abd-el-Krim’s intransigence and the habitual ministerial inertia in the face of military opposition, Alba gave little serious consideration to such an undertaking.

When Primo de Rivera came to power in September 1923, he therefore faced two major obstacles to change in Morocco: the Riffi and the africanistas. The Riffi prevented pacification and the africanistas impeded abandonment. Prior to 1923 Primo de Rivera himself was an abandonista. On two occasions, in 1917 and again in 1921, he had publicly advocated Spanish withdrawal from Morocco. It was a surprise to many, therefore, when the conspiratorial ‘Quadrilateral’ of Generals Leopoldo Saro, Antonio Dabán, Federico Berenguer, and José Cavalcanti — whose opinions were decidedly africanista — backed Primo de Rivera’s coup d’état.

Ironically, Primo de Rivera never totally abjured his abandonist sentiments; he merely compromised them. On the one hand, then, he assured Spaniards in his ‘Barcelona Manifesto’ that ‘we are not imperialists, nor do we hold that upon a stubborn insistence in Morocco depends the honour of the Army . . . ’ On the other hand, he mollified the africanistas by promising a ‘prompt, worthy, and reasonable’ solution to the Moroccan problem. In none of his public utterances during the first critical months of the Military Directory did he once suggest that Spain would abandon the Protectorate, yet he constantly reiterated the theme that in the future Morocco should not cost Spain ‘more sacrifices in manpower and money than it has already cost’.

For a short time, Primo de Rivera’s equivocations assuaged both abandonistas and anti-abandonistas. Their main purpose, however, was to conceal the fact that the Directory had no concrete solution to the Moroccan problem. Even such a sympathetic observer as Tomás García Figueras had to acknowledge that ‘the Military Directory did not have, when it took the reins of power, a perfectly defined programme with respect to Morocco.’ This is not to say that the Dictator did not have certain precepts that were to guide his conduct in the Protectorate. As the course of events in the three months following the coup indicated, Primo de Rivera had three designs vis-à-vis Morocco: first, he hoped to end the conflict with Abd-el-Krim by negotiation; second, he intended
to reduce both costs and the number of Spanish troops, particularly conscripts in the Protectorate; and third, he desired to reform and shore up the Spanish Army’s position in North Africa. These goals were not new and had been, paradoxically, an integral part of Alba’s programme.\(^8\) The difference now, however, was that they were being pursued by a Military Directory with the power of censorship and martial law and, oddly enough, with the temporary acquiescence of the africanistas.

The tensions inherent in the situation, nonetheless, were never far from the surface. The fruitless efforts Primo de Rivera made to negotiate a settlement with Abd-el-Krim in October 1923 were pursued in the strictest secrecy lest they be discovered by both the africanistas and the parliamentary opposition.\(^9\) And the diminution of the 1924 conscription roles by 20 percent and the early release of 29,000 draftees in November 1923, and 26,000 more in March 1924, drew sharp rebukes from the africanistas. In the pages of the old colonial journal, *Revista Hispanoaficana*, and the recently founded *Revista de Tropas Coloniales*, africanista discontent erupted in the early months of 1924.\(^10\)

In the meantime, September 1923 witnessed not only Primo de Rivera’s coup d’etat but also the expansion and radicalization of Abd-el-Krim’s movement in the Riff. Egged on by leftist opinion in Europe, his own advisers, and what he judged to be the weak position of the African Army, Abd-el-Krim pushed his rebellion from the Central Riff into the Gomara and the Djebala.\(^11\) By the spring of 1924 the Riffi Chief’s forces were exerting such pressure on both the western and eastern fronts that Primo de Rivera was forced to consider alternatives to the status quo. For the Dictator the options were not easy ones as they involved either an all-out offensive against the rebels, the total abandonment of the Zone, or lastly a middle course which entailed the abandonment of certain interior positions coupled with a reciprocal show of force — what Primo de Rivera referred to as ‘semi-abandonment.’

It was the latter path that Primo de Rivera decided to follow. On 5 May 1924, he ordered the High Commissioner, General Luis Aizpuru, to concentrate most of the Moroccan air units in Melilla and to undertake the systematic ‘destruction of villages and livestock, the dispersion of all matter of concentrations and markets and, above all, the burning of crops . . . ’ in the rebel zone.\(^12\) In turn Primo de Rivera followed this in early May with a memorandum to the King in which he outlined ‘the dignified and sensible solution concerning Africa that the Manifesto of
13 September 1923, promised the country. It included among its most important points:

the pullback of our troops to stronger and safer positions that will permit the reduction of current and consequent expenses and behind which the Protectorate may be consolidated and made a model of organization.\textsuperscript{15}

The formulation of this concrete plan was accompanied by a discreet speaking campaign to convince both the Spanish people, and more importantly the Spanish Army, that a general retreat in the Protectorate was a strategic necessity. In the months of May and June 1924 Primo de Rivera made five major speeches in Barcelona, Zaragoza, Segovia, Sevilla, and Málaga to persuade his listeners, as he stated in Málaga on 26 June, that 'it is necessary that this Moroccan problem does not compromise the national development of Spain.\textsuperscript{16} Less discreet was a classified report entitled \textit{Acuerdos adoptados por el Directorio para el Planteo y Desarrollo del Problema de África} which General Aizpuru sent to his immediate subordinates sometime after 5 June and which outlined the Dictator's plan to abandon most of the Protectorate's interior and to reduce troop strengths from approximately 125,000 to 50,000 men by the end of September (1924).\textsuperscript{17}

The objections to Primo de Rivera's new programme were immediate and vociferous. Even before the Dictator announced his intentions, the \textit{Revista de Tropas Coloniales} published a series of articles calling for a more forward policy in Morocco and criticizing, in the words of Lt. Col. Francisco Franco's infamous April article, the 'passivity and inaction' of the Directory.\textsuperscript{18} Even more troublesome was what General José Sanjurjo, the commander of the Melillan Sector and a personal friend of the Dictator's, described as the discontent of 'the young people of the front line.'\textsuperscript{19} Strident to the point of disobedience, these young africanistas took advantage of Primo de Rivera's first tour of the Protectorate (11-21 July, 1924) to openly express their discontent. In almost every garrison that the Dictator visited during his eleven days in the Protectorate the reception was marred by some snub.\textsuperscript{20} The most blatant show of dissatisfaction, however, came on the afternoon of 19 July during a banquet hosted by Franco at the Legion encampment of Ben Tieb. According to one eyewitness it was characterized by a 'mordant irony and an inconceivable lack of respect . . . \textsuperscript{21}

Smarting from his summer tour of the Zone, Primo de Rivera returned to the Peninsula on 21 July and railed against 'troublemakers and conspirators' while insisting that semi-abandonment was the only
workable solution to the Moroccan problem. Although africanista discontent continued both in the Protectorate and, to a limited degree, in Spain throughout much of 1924 and early 1925, its actual achievements were limited. Admittedly Primo de Rivera never carried through with his 1917 proposal to abandon the Protectorate, but neither, on the other hand, did the africanistas push him into a more forward policy. Seemingly, the africanistas lacked both the organization and power to force a radical change in the Dictator's programme. They had the capacity to retard but not to initiate. In addition, the last thing the africanistas probably wanted to see in the late summer of 1924 was a coup against the Directory. With Abd-el-Krim's harkas moving into the Western Sector of the Protectorate it would undoubtedly have been suicidal for them to have turned their attention toward a second pronunciamiento. Finally, the africanistas may have been an influential segment of the Spanish Army but they did not command much of a following in civilian Spain. By 1924 most Spaniards were sick of the Moroccan war and supported Primo de Rivera's efforts to end it. There would have been very little popular support within Spain for a more africanista regime.

Thus with the Army's acquiescence and the public's support, the Dictator accepted Luis Aizpuru's resignation on 14 October 1924, personally assumed the High Commissariat, and prepared to oversee the relinquishment of the Protectorate's interior positions. The abandonment itself entailed two steps. The first was the rescue of the advanced post of Xauen on 28 September and the subsequent accumulation of most of the Western Sector's front line troops at that key position. The second, which was initiated on 15 November, involved the orderly retreat of between 25,000 and 30,000 men from Xauen to a line of fortified positions (the so-called Primo de Rivera Line) some ten kilometers south of Tetuán. Completed on 12 December the retreat proved an arduous task hindered by bad weather and constant enemy harassment. In all, the entire operation — both the rescue of Xauen and the subsequent retreat — cost the African Army some 1,500 dead, 5,800 wounded, and 460 missing in action: many less casualties than were rumoured at the time or subsequently, but a high ratio nonetheless.

Primo de Rivera's 'semi-abandonment' of the Protectorate's Western Sector has traditionally been interpreted as at worst an unmitigated disaster and at best a sound but not a definitive Spanish defeat. Perhaps a more equitable assessment of the retreat would be that it was a difficult, bloody, but disciplined withdrawal of Spanish forces from an
untenable situation that prevented a second Annual.

Beyond averting another debacle, however, 'semi-abandonment' proved to be a temporary palliative. As the africanistas quickly noted, the Riffi Rebellion continued and the African Army still faced a particularly dangerous situation in the Western Sector. What then was to be done to solve the continuing Moroccan problem? A secret report which Primo de Rivera submitted to the Directory in late November 1924 seemed to indicate that in the near future the Dictator contemplated following 'semi-abandonment' with the almost total abandonment of the Protectorate. Publicly, however, Primo de Rivera offered a course that was neither as drastic nor as definite. In an interview which he granted Spanish journalists on 4 December 1924, the Dictator stated that in the future his purpose in Morocco was to establish 'a united front, solidly consisting of strong positions and bases and by a chain of blockhouses completely assuring that in the improbable case of rebellion the weight of our superiority would be felt in a devastating way.' In short, Primo de Rivera rejected the idea of totally abandoning the Protectorate but he also made it clear that for the present he had no intention of pursuing a military reconquest of the rebel zone. What he envisioned was a purely defensive and static posture that would allow the further reduction of Spanish forces in the Protectorate.

The following six months witnessed a total reversal in this policy. The primary cause of this about-face was Abd-el-Krim's highly successful invasion of the French Protectorate on 13 April 1925, and France's subsequent efforts to create a Franco-Spanish alliance against the Rebel Chief. Although there had been little cooperation between France and Spain regarding Morocco before 1925, mutual self-interest in what amounted to a desperate situation, at least for the French, necessitated collaboration. The outcome was a Franco-Spanish Conference which met in Madrid between 17 June and 25 July 1925 — Paris being plagued by, as Primo de Rivera put it, an 'ambience of communism and the free press' — and resulted in the signing of six separate accords which, among other things, adopted concrete measures to impede both maritime and terrestrial contraband, elucidated the peace terms that the Allies would offer the Riffi, and stipulated a vague agreement which bound both sides to joint military operations should Abd-el-Krim reject the proffered peace terms.

In the meantime, to take advantage of France's plight and its inevitable assistance, Primo de Rivera was hastily pushing forward a plan
that he had been seriously considering since mid-April: an amphibious assault on Alhucemas Bay, the geographic centre of the Riff movement. Entrusted to General Ignacio Despujol, Primo de Rivera’s Moroccan Chief of Staff, on 11 May 1925, the preparation for the undertaking proceeded throughout the late spring and summer of 1925. By the end of August, Despujol and his immediate subordinates (Manuel Goded, Joaquin Fanjul, and Antonio Aranda) had completed their work and two brigades of 11,119 and 9,760 men under the respective commands of Generals Emilio Fernández Pérez and Leopoldo Saro and under the over-all authority of General José Sanjurjo had been organized and concentrated in Melilla and Ceuta for the invasion of the strategic Bay in early September.

These martial preparations were also accompanied by sincere Allied attempts to initiate peace negotiations with Abd-el-Krim. In June and July 1925 both Spanish and French agents made several trips to the Riff capital of Axdir to induce the Riffi Chief to parley with the Allies. They offered Abd-el-Krim control over most of the Spanish Protectorate and a considerable degree of autonomy; in turn the Riffi leader was to withdraw his troops from the French Zone and to allow the Spanish occupation of Alhucemas Bay. Beyond token and unofficial talks with the Allies in late July, however, the Riffi leader declined to consider protracted negotiations. With the aid of hindsight, Abd-el-Krim’s refusal to deal with the Europeans was an unmitigated disaster for the Riffi cause. In the short run it cemented the Franco-Spanish alliance more solidly than the recent Madrid Conference had. It also prompted the Allies to step up their operations against smugglers, and, more important, it led them to plan a series of coordinated military campaigns that were to be undertaken in the coming months. In the long run it kept the Franco-Spanish alliance intact and ensured that neither power would perceive any benefit in trying to conclude a separate agreement with the Riffi. In short, Abd-el-Krim’s inflexible stance in the face of potentially overwhelming might was a major blunder.

The dimensions of this mistake were brought forcefully home to the Riffi on the morning of 8 September 1925, when Colonel Francisco Franco led the vanguard column of General Saro’s Brigade ashore at Ixdaïn Beach some ten kilometers north-west of Abd-el-Krim’s capital. The approximately 5,000 Riffi defenders were both caught off-guard by the landing and overwhelmed by the superior Spanish naval and aerial fire power. As a result the African Army was able to establish a small enclave on the beach and to land thousands of men and tons of supplies. In the south the French took advantage of the disembarkation
to start pushing the Rififi back into the Spanish Sector. Subsequent Spanish moves during the rest of September proved slow but effective. By 2 October 1925, a company of Fernández Pérez's forces commanded by Major Enrique Varela entered Axdir, Abd-el-Krim's capital, and looted and razed the houses belonging to Abd-el-Krim and his relatives.33

The occupation of Axdir signalled for the time being an end to the joint Franco-Spanish drives in the Protectorate. The fear of overextending Allied lines and the hazards of initiating a new offensive at the beginning of the rainy season brought a quiescent period which lasted well into the spring of 1926. During this time, however, plans were being formulated for the final move against the Rififi. Flushed by the Alhucemas victory Primo de Rivera refused to reconsider peace negotiations; instead Abd-el-Krim and his immediate followers were to be forced into unconditional surrender: 'No peace gesture with Abd-el-Krim is convenient:' he telegraphed General Despujol on 10 November 1925, 'we can make pacts of this sort with the tribes and even with other rebel chiefs but always without admitting the possibility of Abd-el-Krim ever having any kind of position within the Spanish Protectorate.'34 And in a letter written on 16 November to the recently appointed High Commissioner, General Sanjurjo, Primo de Rivera outlined in general terms the aggressive course that the Army of Africa was to follow in the Central Riff: 'Our initiative,' he wrote, 'must be directed at continuing the persecution destined to break Abd-el-Krim's power in the Beni Urriaguel . . .35

Rejecting then the more pacific path vis-à-vis Abd-el-Krim that he had been advocating since September 1923, Primo de Rivera both hosted and sent representatives to a series of conferences with the French in February and March 1926, to concretize future military plans. As a result of these meetings, the Allies formulated detailed proposals which called for a forceful French drive into the southern sector of the Spanish Zone on 15 April 1926, and a concomitant Spanish push from Alhucemas Bay on 1 May. Abd-el-Krim's forces (which numbered approximately 17,000 men as opposed to a projected Allied force of 83,000 men) were thereupon to be caught in a vice-like squeeze, defeated, and forced into unconditional surrender.36

While the Spanish and senior officers of the French Moroccan forces enthusiastically supported this plan, the politicians in Paris and Rabat started to have second thoughts. An on-going financial crisis in the
metropolis plus an indigenous revolt in French Syria made the peaceful settlement of the conflict seem a more practical way out. In addition Paul Painlevé's successor as Prime Minister, Aristide Briand — the ex-Socialist and father of the Locarno Pact — was more inclined to favour a pacific solution in Morocco than a military one, and in this predilection he was supported by the new Morrocan Resident-General, Theodore Steeg, and his civilian staff. Thus when certain of Abd-el-Krim's closest advisers approached Léon Gabrielli, the French 'Controller' in Uxda, in mid-March (1926) and informed him that the Riffi Leader desired to initiate negotiations on the basis of the previous recognition of the Sultan (and, by implication, France's and Spain's imperial claims), Steeg moved quickly to confirm the offer. By the beginning of April the French had unilaterally arranged a conference with Abd-el-Krim.

Although sceptical of these Riffi overtures and infuriated at Briand for initiating unilateral negotiations, Primo de Rivera reluctantly agreed on 6 April to follow the French lead. The result was the so-called Uxda Conference of 18 April–1 May 1926, which proved to be a contest of two opposing objectives: the Allies conceiving of it as a means by which Abd-el-Krim could make a graceful exit without the agony of complete defeat and unconditional surrender; the Riffi, on the other hand, judging it as a way of splitting the Allied front and maintaining a modicum of Riffi autonomy. Neither side, as a consequence, was particularly realistic. The Allies, especially the French, misjudged the determined and almost jihad esprit that motivated the Riffi leadership while the Riffi failed to appreciate the real threat of their movement to the maintenance of European control in Morocco.

It was hardly a surprise, therefore, that the conference ended on 6 May 1926 in a stalemate and that on 8 May the Allies threw some 83,000 men against the shrinking remnants of Abd-el-Krim's harkas. The end came rather quickly for Abd-el-Krim. On 16 May the Riffi Chief, his family and closest advisers deserted the battlefield and fled to a neutral area. Eleven days later, 27 May they trekked to the small central Riffi village of Tarquist with a caravan of 270 mules and a quarter of a million dollars in gold coins and surrendered, significantly, to the French.

Abdel-Krim's surrender on 27 May marked the conclusion of the Riffi Rebellion — the end of almost five years of continuous war in the Spanish Protectorate. It did not, however, provide the solution to the
Moroccan problem. Large areas of the Protectorate were still unpacified. Moreover, a few of Abd-el-Krim's followers (at most probably no more than 5,000), who had survived the Allied advances of mid-May, were even prepared to carry on the fight against the Spanish. Although this opposition was local in character and insignificant when compared to Abd-el-Krim's movement, it still impeded the total pacification of the Zone and as such its elimination was seen by the africanistas as the sine qua non of any true Protectorate. A second problem which the Spanish faced in May 1926 was the presence of the French Army in their zone. Although the French had pledged to relinquish all Spanish territory occupied during the fighting by 1 September 1926, it became increasingly apparent during the summer of 1926 that they had no intention of doing so. A number of border tribes, which according to the Treaty of 1912 had been a part of the Spanish Protectorate, were slowly absorbed — much to the chagrin of the africanistas, if not Primo de Rivera's civilian cabinet — into the French Protectorate.

Primo de Rivera's attitude toward these two problems was ambivalent. In a series of letters he wrote General Sanjurjo during the summer of 1926, he indicated that on the one hand he did support the suppression of dissidence in the Protectorate while at the same time he felt that this should be undertaken as slowly and as cheaply as possible: 'If Abd-el-Krim through his qa'ids' he confided to Sanjurjo on 21 July 1926, 'inspired widespread terror and subdued extensive territories with fewer men and weapons than we employ, then there is no reason why we cannot do the same if we use similar methods and terrorist systems . . .'42 And in a frank letter to Sanjurjo on 13 August he admitted:

I believe my duty in this case is completely clear . . . to lift from this country the burden of Morocco, even going, once the honour of the army is secured, so far as to abandon the Protectorate if sustaining it means spending a céntimo more than 180,000,000 pesetas in the 1927 budget — a sum which would be one-half the current expense but which would still be ruinous.43

As far as the French occupation of Spanish territory was concerned, Primo de Rivera did support Sanjurjo's efforts to move troops into the southern areas of the Protectorate and gently nudge the French back into their Zone. Yet when it came to the test of the Franco-Spanish Conference of 13 June—10 July 1926, Primo de Rivera did not forcefully call upon the French to live up to their previous agreements (i.e., 1912, 1925) but allowed the formation of an on-going committee to look into the boundary question. In a year's time the committee would
decide to accept the fait accompli of the French occupation of the disputed areas. 

Although Primo de Rivera’s doubts concerning the maintenance of the Protectorate and his less than forceful stand against the French probably troubled Sanjurjo and other high ranking africanistas, they had the consolation of knowing that even during the dark days of 1924 Primo de Rivera had refused to abandon the Protectorate. Moreover, by August 1926 the idea of giving up the territory had become almost academic as the Spanish Army controlled all of the Riff, most of the Gomara, and was planning the subjugation of the Djebala which would be completed in July 1927. In addition, even if the cost of maintaining the Zone was a drain on the Spanish economy, it was not likely — given the martial basis of his regime — that the Dictator could abandon it. Primo de Rivera needed africanista support to keep him in power. Despite his consistent desire for reductions in Spain’s commitment to the Protectorate, the ‘honour of the Army’ — or at least an important portion of it — demanded that the country remain a colonial power in North Africa.

NOTES

1. Santiago Alba was the Foreign Minister and probably the most significant member of the García Prieto Cabinet (7 December 1922–13 September 1923), the last Cabinet of the Restoration. For Alba’s Moroccan policy see Maximiano García Venero, Santiago Alba: monarquico de razón (Madrid 1963), 173, 225-29, and S.G. Payne, Politics and the Military in Modern Spain (Stanford 1967), 208.


3. Tomás García Figueras, Marruecos (Madrid 1944), 189. Up to this point the day to day running of the Protectorate had been a purely military matter. All
High Commissioners — the highest Spanish authority in the Protectorate's administration — had been Army lieutenant generals. Their staffs were usually composed of Army officers of various ranks. In addition, the Zone was subdivided into three autonomous military districts, Melilla, Ceuta and Larache, which were headed by major generals. Alba's appointment of a civilian High Commissioner in February 1923, therefore, was a radical break with the past and was preceded by a Royal Decree (17 January 1923) which decentralized the High Commissioner's military authority. For a fuller discussion of the Protectorate's administration see: José María Cordero Torres, Organización del Protectorado español en Marruecos (2 vols.) (Madrid 1942-43).

4. See Santiago Alba to Romanones, 28 July 1924, Romanones Archives, (hereafter RA) Legajo no.63, carpeta no.81 in which the former Foreign Minister notes that he never publicly or privately advocated the abandonment of the Protectorate.


6. For the activities of the 'Quadrilateral' during the summer of 1923 see Payne, op. cit., 195; Cf also Carlos Seco Serrano, Alfonso XIII y la crisis de la Restauración (Barcelona 1969), 158-59 and General Cándido Pardo González, Al servicio de la verdad (Madrid 1930), 357-58.

7. Quoted in Carlos Hernández de Herrera and Tomás García Figueras, Acción de España en Marruecos, I (Madrid 1929), 482.

8. ABC, 16 September 1923, 19.

9. Hernández de Herrera and Tomás García Figueras, op. cit., 482.

10. For a comparison with Alba's programme see García Venero, op. cit., 173, 225-29.

11. Francisco Hernández Mir, El proceso de las responsabilidades: Artículos publicados en La Libertad de Madrid, entre el 22 de julio y el 4 de diciembre de 1931 (n.p., n.d.) 80-83; Hernández Mir, La Dictadura en Marruecos (Madrid 1930), 75-86.

12. Miguel Primo de Rivera, La obra de la Dictadura: Primo de Rivera. Sus cuatro últimos artículos (Madrid 1930), 10; Payne, op. cit., 209; ABC, 24 October 1923, 10. The newspapers, particularly in November and December, reported on a daily basis the return of Spanish conscripts from North Africa, see, for instance, El Sol, 23 November 1923, 8; 28 November 1923, 8, and 30 November 1923, 8. For africanista discontent see, for instance, Revista Hispanoaficana, XII (December 1923), 325; Antonio Goicoechea, 'Alhucemas y los beniurriagueles' in Revista de Tropas Coloniales (hereafter RTC), I (January 1924), 2-3, and General Gonzalo Queipo de Llano, 'El problema de Marruecos' in RTC, II (February 1924), 1-2.


14. Operations Section to C.O. Melillan Air Force, 5 May, 1924, Sección de África, Servicio Histórico Militar (SHM), Legajo no.1-6-11-382, carpeta no.5-2-12, Melillan Sector, 1924.
15. Primo de Rivera to H R H Alfonso XIII, no date but probably presented during the latter part of May 1924, SHM, Legajo no.2-1-4-403, carpeta no.6-9-2-12, Melillan Sector, 1924.

16. ABC, 6 May 1924, 7; ABC, 28 May 1924, 7; for a typescript of Primo de Rivera's Zaragoza speech, see RA, Legajo no.28, carpeta no.9, and ABC 3 June 1924, 7; for Primo's remarks in Sevilla see ABC, 24 June 1924, 19, and for his Málaga speech see ABC, 26 June 1924, 12 and 27 June 1924, 9.

17. 'Acuerdos adoptados por el Directorio para el Planteo y Desenvolvimiento del Problema de Africa' (no date), in SHM, Legajo no.2-1-4-403, carpeta no.26-9-2-12, Melillan Sector, 1924.


19. General José Sanjurjo to General Primo de Rivera, 16 June 1924, SHM, Legajo no.2-1-4-403, carpeta no.26-9-2-13, Melillan Sector, 1924.

20. Notas de un testigo presencial acerca del viaje del General Presidente a Marruecos', in RA, Legajo no.28, carpeta no.9.

21. 'Relato . . . de lo ocurrido durante el viaje de Pte. a Africa' in RA, Legajo no.58, carpeta no.41. See also Ricardo de la Cierva, Francisco Franco: Un siglo de España, X ('La primera retirada de Francisco Franco') (Madrid 1972), 224-27.

22. For Primo de Rivera's July 24th speech in San Sebastián see typescript in RA, Legajo no.74, carpeta no.3.


24. General Julián Serrano to Primo de Rivera, 29 September 1924 in SHM, Legajo no.2-4-1-6, 'Documentos relacionados con Abd-el-Krim'; for a more amplified discussion of this advance see Ricardo de la Cierva, Francisco Franco . . . , X, op. cit., 235-37, and V. Cabanellas, Asedio y defensa de Xauen (Madrid 1926); Woolman, op.cit., 139; Hernández de Herrera and García Figueras, op. cit., 537-38 and 'Xauen la triste; del diario del General Franco' in RTC, IV (April 1926), 145-46.

25. Casualty data compiled from 'Diario de operaciones', (Ceuta), in SHM, Legajo no.2-7-6-52, carpetas no.4-1-12 through 4-10-12; and hospital reports of November—December 1924 in SHM, Legajo no.2-7-8-64, no carpeta number but titled 'Bajas diciembre' and Legajo no.2-7-6-52, carpeta no.4-12-2, Ceutan Sector, 1924; for contemporary rumours see Hernández Mir, El Proceso de las Responsabilidades . . . , op. cit., 100, and General Eduardo López de Ochoa, De la Dictadura a la República (Barcelona 1932), 68.


27. ABC, 5 December 1924, 9; see also Capitán Vial de Morla (pseud. of Tomás García Figueras), La labor del Directorio en el problema nacional de Marruecos (Jerez de la Frontera, n.d.).

28. Between December 1924 and April 1925, for instance, 35,000 Spaniards
had been sent back to Spain and the Government planned to repatriate twenty-six battalions in the next nine months, ABC, 18 April 1925, 9; Primo de Rivera to Duque de Tetuán, 2 April 1925, as reprinted in Manuel and Arminán, op. cit., 800.

29. For the events leading up to the conference see Fleming, op. cit., 247-55; the actual accord can be found in Acuerdos Hispano-Franceses celebrados como consecuencia de la conferencia de Madrid de 1925 (Madrid 1925).

30. Primo de Rivera to Gen. Ignacio Despujol, 11 May 1925 in SHM, Legajo no.2-2-2-449, carpeta no.28-6-613, Melillan Sector, 1925; for background on the Alhucemas project see J.M. Troncoso, B. Quintana, and M. Santiago Guerrero, La columna Saro en el desembarco de Alhucemas (Madrid 1926), and Fleming, op. cit., 263-77.

31. For an extensive discussion of these negotiations see Ibid., 255-63 and Walter B. Harris, France, Spain and the Rif (London 1927), 271.

32. For a detailed discussion of this landing see S.E. Fleming, 'El problema español de Marruecos y el desembarco en Alhucemas' in Revista de Historia Militar, 35 (1973), 155-72 and Francisco Franco, 'Alhucemas: del diario del Coronel Franco' in RTC, II (September 1925), 1-2.

33. Manuel Goded, Marruecos: las etapas de la pacificación (Madrid 1932), 231-33; Goded to Sanjurjo, 2 October 1925 in SHM, Legajo no.2-2-2-451, carpeta no.29-11-13, Melillan Sector, 1925.

34. Primo de Rivera to General Ignacio Despujol, 10 November 1925, in SHM, Legajo no.2-2-3-457, carpeta no.34-19, Melillan Sector, 1925.

35. 'Carta política de Presidente del Directorio sobre el plan a seguir en Alhucemas', 16 November 1925 in SHM, Legajo no.2-2-2-449, carpeta no. 28-5-4-13, Melillan Sector, 1925.

36. A copy of this plan can be found in Goded, op. cit., 254-56; see also Juan de España, La actuación de España en Marruecos (Madrid 1926), 328 and Francisco Hernández Mir, Del desastre a la victoria: El Rif por España, IV (Madrid 1927), 46-49.


39. ABC, 7 April 1926, 13.

40. For a detailed discussion of the Uxda Conference see Harris, op. cit., 273-304 and Fleming, op. cit., 337-45.

41. For the final campaign against Abd-el-Krim see Dirección General de Marruecos y Colonias — Sección Militar, 'Resumen de las principales operaciones militares durante el año 1926' 15 January 1927, in FGF, 4-5; for Abd-el-Krim's surrender see Sanjurjo to Primo de Rivera, 26 May 1926, in SHM, Legajo no. 2-4-1-1-, carpeta no.15, 'Documentos relacionados con Abd-el-Krim'; Primo de Rivera to Sanjurjo, 28 May 1926, in SHM, Legajo no.2-4-1-1, carpeta no.15, 'Documentos relacionados con Abd-el-Krim'; Colonel Patxot to Sanjurjo, 29 May 1926, in SHM, Legajo no.2-4-1-1, carpeta no.15, 'Documentos relacionados con Abd-el-Krim'; General Boichut to General Sanjurjo, 27 May 1926, in SHM, Legajo no.2-2-10-500, no carpeta, Melillan Sector, 1926 and Lt.Col. Rodríguez to
General Goded, no date, in SHM, Legajo no.2-4-1-1, carpeta no.15, ‘Documentos relacionados con Abd-el-Krim’.
42. Primo de Rivera to Sanjurjo, 21 July 1926, Manual and Armiñán, op. cit., 373-76.
43. Primo de Rivera to Sanjurjo, 13 August 1926, in Ibid., 383.
44. For a biased discussion of this conference see Hernández Mir, Del desastre . . . , Iv. op. cit., 196-204 and ‘El pacto franco-español de París’ in Revista Hispanoaficana, IV (June-July 1926), 5-8. France annexed the kabyles of Gezawa, Beni Zerwal and Geznaya.

GERMANY AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS
Christoph M Kimmich

Germany was finally admitted to the League of Nations in 1926, only to withdraw in 1933: this study sheds light on the history of both the League itself and Germany. Germany’s relations with the League are seen as a mirror of the domestic fortunes of Weimar and as an indication of the extent to which republican Germany had broken with the traditions of the past. Kimmich finds that the impact of the revolutions of 1918-19 and the democratic system of the Weimar Republic were never more than superficial, and he emphasizes the basic incompatibility between the League and Germany.

BY KENYA POSSESSED
The Correspondence of J H Oldham and Norman Leys, 1918-1926
John W Cell, editor

Between 1918 and 1926, in a correspondence that began as a fruitful partnership and ended in explosive confrontation, Dr Norman Leys and Dr Joseph H Oldham explored the vital issues that were raised by colonialism in Africa. This is a selection of exceptionally thoughtful letters that reflect upon the political economy of the area, the nature and determinants of racial and cultural differences, and the role of Christianity in a racially stratified society.