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One of the questions that has been raised concerning the events in Spanish Morocco in July 1936 is how a group of army and token civilian conspirators subjugated a geographically disjointed area with such rapidity and with so little resistance? In response, General Franco’s apologists have pointed to the conspirators’ decisiveness and organization, the cowardice of the Protectorate’s Republican authorities, and the support of the Zone’s indigenous population. On the other hand, critics of this viewpoint have argued that the Protectorate’s subjugation resulted from the Republic’s exaggerated fear of indigenous discontent which kept it from both declawing the Army of Africa and monitoring the conspiratorial activities of its anti-Republican officers. It has also been stated that the Republic’s supporters in Melilla, Ceuta, Tetuán and Larache were never really given a chance by local authorities to arm themselves. As for indigenous support, these critics note that with the exception of the ‘feudal leadership’ in Tetuán, the Protectorate’s Moroccan population greeted the Alzamiento Nacional either with indifference or muted resistance.

Looking at the question with hindsight, and perhaps more dispassion, one could possibly answer it with an amalgam of these two viewpoints. Specifically, the success of the rebellion in the Protectorate on 17-18 July 1936, can be ascribed to five factors: first, the Army of Africa’s importance to the Second Republic as a guarantor of peace and order in the Zone and the Republican authorities’ early acceptance of this ‘fact of life’; second, as a consequence of this, the Army of Africa’s high state of combat preparedness, particularly its indigenous units and the Foreign
Legion; third, the decisiveness, organization and luck of the army
conspirators; fourth, the support of the Caliph, the Gran Visir and
other administrative elites (whether enthusiastically is a moot
point), and the indifference of the indigenous masses; and fifth, the
unwillingness or inability of the Republican authorities and the
political left to mount an effective opposition to the uprising.

In the short run, the success of the July 1936 uprising in the Pro-
tectorate proved essential to the continued maintenance of the less
than efficacious revolt in the Iberian Peninsula. 3 From 19 July to 6
August 1936, it furnished Francisco Franco and his staff with a
secure haven from which to assess peninsular events and to plan
their next moves. More importantly, since they could be dispensed
with in the Protectorate, it allowed the Spanish Nationalists an op-
portunity, with the assistance of German and Italian equipment, to
aerlift Army of Africa units across the Straits in order to sustain the
pockets of revolt in southern Spain.

In the long run, as this essay will suggest, the Protectorate played
a role (beyond that of a staging area and a convalescent centre) in
the Nationalists’ eventual victory — and this despite the fact that it
remained peripheral to the actual fighting during the balance of the
Civil War. First under High Commissioner General Luis Orgaz
(July 1936-March 1937) and then under interim High Commis-
sioner Colonel Juan Beigbeder (April 1937-August 1939), the
Spanish Nationalists effectively mobilized their ‘Zona feliz’ for the
war effort. 4 This mobilization encompassed three areas: a military
mobilization, an economic mobilization and a political mobiliza-
tion.

The Protectorate’s military mobilization during the Civil War can
be divided into three unequal stages: the conquest of July 1936, the
Army of Africa’s airlift to Spain between July and December 1936,
and the ongoing recruitment of indigenous volunteers for the
Army of Africa through early 1939.

Initially, this mobilization was a manageable task since the
Army of Africa was mostly stationed in the Protectorate and had
committed itself, almost to a man, to the rebellion. 5 In total
numbers this gave the Spanish Nationalists 34,047, as Stanley
Payne has observed, ‘of the best-trained, best-led, best-equipped
and most sternly disciplined and combat-worthy troops in the Nat-
ionalist Army’. 6 The makeup of this force was heavily weighted to
European mercenaries and indigenous troops. Some 11 per cent or 3,758 men were Legionnaires (mostly Spaniards); another 50 per cent or 17,009 men were indigenous regulares and mehal-las; and the remaining 39 per cent or 13,280 men were regular Spanish military.\(^7\)

During the war's first two months, the transportation of these troops to Spain proved a difficult undertaking. This arose from the fact that on the whole the Spanish navy had not followed the army into rebellion. Consequently, through the end of August 1936 the Straits of Gibraltar were closed to Nationalist ships. Lines of communication, however, were quickly established between the Nationalist chiefs in Tetuán and the Germans and Italians; and by the end of July, with the aid of ten JU-S2 transports from Germany and the purchase of twelve Italian Savoia S 81 bombers, the Nationalists had initiated an airlift of men and matériel to the Peninsula.\(^8\)

This airlift facilitated the deployment of Protectorate resources in the Peninsula. According to Enrique Arques, during the war's first two months, approximately 10,500 men and 104,000 kilograms of matériel were flown across the Straits. By November 1936, the airlift of manpower had doubled and that of matériel tripled.\(^9\) In the autumn of 1936 these resources were crucial to the Nationalists. Ricardo de la Cierva, for instance, has emphasized their importance in ensuring Nationalist control of southwest Spain early in the war. And Hugh Thomas has noted that the Army of Africa's advance 'altered the political complexion of Spain' in late 1936 by bringing much of Andalucia, most of Extremadura and goodly sections of Castile into the Nationalist camp.\(^10\) It can be argued that without the Army of Africa's resources, the Republic might have contained the uprising, or at least confined it to a more limited geographic area.

After December 1936, the Nationalists' main concern in the Protectorate was not transporting men to Spain but recruiting them so that they could be sent as replacements. While these troops would not play the essential role that they had in late 1936, the doubling of the size of the Nationalist army's indigenous units in early 1937 and increased indigenous casualties — given the fact that they were employed as shock troops — placed a burden on Protectorate officials to furnish more men.\(^11\) It is still not entirely clear how many Moroccans served in Spain during the Civil War. Estimates range from 50,000 to 100,000 men. Miguel Martín theorized that 14 per
cent of the Protectorate’s indigenous population or approximately 100,000 men, fought in Spain. 12 Ricardo de la Cierva, on the other hand, using data furnished by the Protectorate’s Office of Indigenous Affairs, placed the number at 80,000. 13 Recent researchers have tended to reduce these figures. According to data provided by the Archivo de la Guerra de Liberación (Servicio Histórico Militar), some 53,890 Moroccans served in the Nationalist army between 18 July 1936, and 3 September 1937; and for the entire war, Colonel José María Gárate Córdoba has calculated that 62,271 Moroccans fought in Spain. 14

Assuming that Gárate’s figure is more realistic, it would be safe to say that approximately 6 per cent of the Nationalist army’s manpower (based on an estimate of 1,000,000 men serving in this force between 1936 and 1939) were Protectorate indigenes. 15 While this percentage is not very substantial and should probably be reduced even further to take into consideration French Moroccan and Algerian recruits, these men were a factor not so much in terms of quantity as in quality. Their military prowess and preparedness were axiomatic. As David Hart notes, ‘the bravery of the Rifian taburs in Spain in 1936-39 was no less than that of their fathers and elder brothers had been against Spain in 1921-1926’. 16 Moreover, their historic but perhaps exaggerated reputation for brutality and rapaciousness gave the Nationalists a psychological edge. Whole Republican units, as the Pravda correspondent Mikhail Koltsov pointed out on one occasion, were known to have deserted their posts at the suggestion that they would be facing Moroccan troops, and many Spanish villages were abandoned in panic at the least rumour of advancing moros. 17

For the balance of the Civil War, the Protectorate’s military mobilization essentially involved the limited recruitment of replacement personnel for indigenous units. To accomplish this task, the Nationalists relied mainly upon the rural Berber elites and the Servicio de Intervenciones Militares. Similar to the French Moroccan Officiers des Affaires Indigènes, the interventores were Spanish commissioned officers whose mission it was to guarantee peace in the countryside and to act as ‘advisors’ to tribal notables. 18 Bargaining with the local shaikh or even the mqaddim, the interventores initiated the recruitment at the subtribal level. From this point the recruits were funnelled up through the tribe, and then into the Protectorate’s military-administrative network for processing and training. As a general rule, recruits from the same tribe
were trained together and served in the same unit. This had the effect of sustaining morale and avoiding intra-tribal tensions. Furthermore, given their traditional bellicosity, their deference to hierarchical authority and their Spartan life-style, the recruits received a minimum of training in the Zone and were speedily integrated into existing indigenous units.

The motive factors behind the Moroccan support of the Spanish Nationalist cause have been a matter of debate. Franco’s apologists have pointed to the strong professional and personal ties that existed between the rural indigenes and their Spanish military ‘advisors’. They have also noted that the Moroccans were particularly inspired by the fact that they were being sent to fight the atheistic enemies of organized religion. On the other hand, critics of this view have argued that the indigenous recruits and their tribal authorities were actually motivated by more pedestrian factors, namely, the dispensation of prearranged bribes and the promise of pillage.

Here again, the reality may be a synthesis of these two viewpoints. Specifically, indigenous willingness to volunteer for Spanish service can be attributed to three significant factors: first, at the tribal level, the use of ‘liberal subsidies of silver, grain and elaborate weaponry’ to secure recruitment, and, at the individual level, the prospect of a steady income (4 pesetas a day) and daily rations; second, the Nationalists’ skilful employment of religious propaganda which stressed the ‘godlessness’ of the Republican cause and the godliness of their ‘Crusade’; and third, as David Hart — hardly a Franco apologist — defined it, the existence of a ‘mutual liking and respect’ between the Berber tribesmen and their Spanish military ‘advisors’, and in the Nationalist army, their Spanish officers. While these factors did not produce total indigenous volunteerism — during the hard winter of 1937, for instance, there was some resistance to Spanish recruitment — they did an effective job of supplying the Nationalist ranks with Moroccan recruits.

The Protectorate’s economic mobilization was undertaken as resolutely as the military but due to the ‘irrational’ — to use Ramón Perpiñá Grau’s term — and the subsistence nature of the Zone’s economy it proved far less important, with one significant exception, to the war effort. Admittedly, in the summer and fall of
1936 the Protectorate had suffered a series of severe economic shocks. The interruption of maritime trade, the closure of the intra-Zonal frontier, the cutback in government expenditure, and the detrimental effects of torrential winter rains (1935-36) on cereal crops and spring vegetables ensured hard times and scarcity. At the beginning of the war, then, the Spanish Nationalists faced two major economic tasks: first, to keep the Zone’s economy functioning as best possible despite the wartime situation; and second, to harness what they could economically for the war effort.

During the first six months of the war these proved difficult undertakings. By early 1937, however, the situation started to improve as trade and communications were re-established with Nationalist Spain and as the Nationalists imposed some semblance of economic order on the Zone. The thrust of this effort was essentially autarchic following the direction of those programmes that were being institutionalized in Spain. Thus the basic goal was to tie the Protectorate’s economy closely to that of Nationalist Spain and to exclude or at least to curtail foreign competition and enterprise.

Given these prerequisites, one of the regime’s first acts (August 1936) was to fix the Zone’s wholesale and retail prices and to ‘peg’ the peseta at an artificial exchange rate (40 pesetas to the £). Admittedly, such a policy was inflationary — according to official figures, during the years 1936-39 the Protectorate experienced an average annual inflation rate of 19 per cent — but in the short run, at least, it furnished some semblance of fiscal stability. A second series of acts in June 1937 created a Comité Económico Central and various Comités Regionales which had substantial control over the Zone’s imports and exports. Their purpose was to bind the Protectorate’s trade as closely as possible to that of Nationalist Spain by favouring Spanish trading concerns and by creating economic obstacles — such as ‘freezing’ currency due foreign exporters and imposing a barter method of trade — for the Zone’s other major trading partners.

The consequences of this legislation were dramatic: average yearly imports from Spain for 1936-40 (88 million pesetas) almost quadrupled those for 1931-35 (23 million pesetas); while imports from formerly significant suppliers such as Great Britain, France, Belgium, United States, and Japan dropped by anywhere from 30 per cent to 85 per cent. In turn, total exports increased somewhat for the years 1936-37 and then tripled the 1936 figure (27,900,000 pesetas) in 1938-39 (see Table 1).
Table 1
Spanish Morocco: Average Yearly Imports/Exports
(in millions of pesetas)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1931-1935</th>
<th></th>
<th>1936-1940</th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Imports</td>
<td>Exports</td>
<td>Imports</td>
<td>Exports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade with Spain</td>
<td>23.2*</td>
<td>14.2*</td>
<td>88.4*</td>
<td>4.5*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total trade</td>
<td>70.2</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>133.9</td>
<td>58.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of total with Spain</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>75.2</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*These figures do not include imports and exports shipped through Melilla and Ceuta from and to Spain.


As the above figures indicate, the Protectorate’s external trade was, as it historically had been, an overwhelming imbalance of imports over exports. Consequently, large quantities of the Zone’s processed foodstuffs (over 100,000 tons a year in 1937 and in 1938) and practically all of its energy needs and manufactured goods were imported. On the other hand, the Protectorate’s commercial worth to the Spanish Nationalists rested essentially on an exiguous number of exports which included live animals, fresh foodstuffs, small manufactured articles, and of considerable importance, substantial amounts of raw iron ore and lesser amounts of raw lead, manganese, gypsum and copper.²⁸

Internally, the Nationalists promulgated autarchic policies to ensure Spanish, and on a more limited scale, indigenous domination of the Zone’s economy. In early 1938, for instance, High Commissioner Beigbeder expanded the number of Mercantile Registries which required that all new industries and enterprises register their articles of association, by-laws, etc., with the state.²⁹ A second regulation mandated that before an enterprise could be established the organizers had to declare publicly the nature, funding and physical particulars of the concern and to allow time for those who might be prejudiced by it to file official complaints. Exempt from this were those manufacturing enterprises (i.e., soap, tobacco, matches, vegetable fibres) which were established ‘under official
auspices' and enjoyed almost complete monopolies in the Zone and the Presidios of Ceuta and Melilla.  

It was the exploitation of iron ore, however, that epitomized the Protectorate’s economic mobilization and at the same time was the exception to the autarchic rule. The Zone’s mines, located 20 kilometers south-southwest of Melilla, contained (and contain) Morocco’s largest and richest (64 per cent iron content) iron ore deposits. Although operations had been going on since the beginning of the century, it was not until the late 1920s and again in the mid-1930s that annual production exceeded one million tons. Over 80 per cent of this output was mined by the Sociedad Española de Minas del Rif, an exclusively Spanish company which had historically enjoyed the official encouragement of the Protectorate authorities. The Minas del Rif operation was open cut, the ore being drilled in benches cut in the hillside and blasted out. In addition, the ore was crushed and dressed on-site and kilns were available for calcining pyritous (sulphurous) ore. The company also owned and operated a fifteen-mile-long metre-gauged railroad line to Melilla and its own ore quay (in that city) which in the late 1930s handled some 1,500 tons of ore an hour.  

To the Spanish Nationalists the importance of this ore rested on its use as a bartering commodity for German military aid. As the London Times revealed in early 1937, the Protectorate’s military authorities allowed the German-Spanish trading concern, the Compañía Hispano-Marroquí de Transportes (HISMA) pre-eminent rights to the reorganization and exploitation of the Rif mines and the marketing of the ore. Consequently, as official statistics indicate, during the years 1934-38, direct iron ore exports to Germany and Italy increased, respectively from 21 per cent and 5 per cent to 52 per cent and 10 per cent of the Protectorate’s average annual iron ore exports; while in 1939 — with the curtailment of direct German involvement in Protectorate economic affairs — these figures fell and rose to an even 40 per cent each. In turn, by 1939 iron ore exports to Great Britain and France (who, historically, had not imported large amounts from Spanish Morocco) dropped notably: Great Britain imported on the average 19 per cent of total exports for the period 1934-38 but only 12 per cent in 1939. France, on the other hand, imported 6 per cent and less than one half of 1 per cent for the same years. As Table 2 demonstrates, the exploitation of this important resource took two directions: first, with German metallurgical and managerial expertise, a general in-
crease in production; and second, a redirection of it to those central European powers who supported the Spanish Nationalists.

Table 2
Spanish Moroccan Iron Ore Exports (by country)
(in tons)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1929-33 (average annual)</th>
<th>1934-38 (average annual)</th>
<th>1939</th>
<th>1940</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>819</td>
<td>7,798</td>
<td>43,000</td>
<td>55,070</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>125,666</td>
<td>588,964</td>
<td>412,519</td>
<td>12,383</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holland*</td>
<td>276,195</td>
<td>120,394</td>
<td>16,859</td>
<td>79,840</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>55,268</td>
<td>70,051</td>
<td>5,552</td>
<td>41,519</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>61,422</td>
<td>211,897</td>
<td>128,103</td>
<td>193,972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>28,350</td>
<td>110,078</td>
<td>425,472</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>41,989</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>1,492</td>
<td>9,381</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7,724</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other countries</td>
<td>16,329</td>
<td>6,727</td>
<td>6,700</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>607,530</td>
<td>1,125,290</td>
<td>1,038,205</td>
<td>390,508</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Basically, for transport to Germany.


Equal to its military and economic mobilization was the Protectorate’s political mobilization. What this entailed was ensuring the adherence of the Zone’s Spanish population to Nationalist political institutions and Falangist forms, and securing the support of the various segments of the Protectorate’s indigenous population for the Nationalist war effort. The first of these tasks was comparatively easy since the army conspirators had early eliminated the Republican administration and had either incarcerated or shot Republican and leftist politicians and labour leaders. The Protectorate’s Spanish population had little choice but to embrace the Alzamiento Nacional. The only alternatives, given the passions of the time, were exile, imprisonment or execution. For the much larger Spanish populations of Ceuta and Melilla the choices were equally limited. Consequently, the citizens of these Presidios — who had given Popular Front candidates solid majorities in the 1936 elections — became the prototypes of Nationalist-Falangist rectitude.
The political mobilization of the Protectorate's indigenous populations proved in the case of the rural Berber tribesmen fairly simple and in that of the arabized urban inhabitants somewhat problematic. In their dealings with the rural Berbers (approximately 80 per cent of the Zone's population), the Nationalists looked less for outright political mobilization — the politicization of the tribes being considered anathema — and more for concrete military volunteerism. Thus, the political-juridical contact that existed between the tribes and Tetuán was channelled, on a limited basis, through the Servicios de Intervenciones Militares. As David Hart has shown, it was this group of dedicated men who won over the tribal elites to the Alzamiento Nacional and who ensured the ongoing recruitment of the Zone's rural indigenes for the Nationalist army. They did this through a combination of personal charisma, the dispensation of liberal ‘pensions’ (the British consul estimated that between 1936 and 1939 these averaged 300,000 pesetas a month), and the shrewd employment of propaganda which stressed the religious nature of the Nationalist ‘crusade’ against the ‘reds’. These methods were so successful that despite the significant rate of indigenous battle casualties and the economic hardships caused by the war, the Protectorate's tribes remained mostly quiescent and cooperative. When significant discontent did surface, it was dealt with swiftly, ruthlessly and discreetly.

In their dealings with the Protectorate's urban indigenes, on the other hand, the Spanish found that they were facing a population whose level of cultural and political sophistication precluded the simplistic methods of the interventores. Of much more importance in this instance was the procurement of political legitimacy by inducing the Caliph and his administration to support the revolt and by wooing the Protectorate's small but vocal Moroccan Nationalist movement. By their nature these objectives negated the use of force. In fact, the situation demanded more subtle measures: selective concessions, the playing off of various interest groups, and sophisticated propaganda. According to Charles Halstead, High Commissioner Juan Beigbeder was adept at all three of these.

Although there is still some debate as to whether Caliph Mulay Hassan initially supported the uprising, there is no doubt that he and his Gran Visir, Ahmed El Gannia, quickly and pragmatically accepted the new regime, thereby granting it immediate legitimacy. In fact, when the Republican air force bombed Tetuán's 'native quarter' on 18 July 1936, Beigbeder induced El
Gannia to play the central role in calming the agitated populace, thus averting a potentially troublesome situation. And, throughout the war, the Caliph did the High Commissioner's bidding by pliantly endorsing Spanish legislation and by making speeches and even granting a few interviews in which he praised Nationalist Spain's 'good works' and its sense of 'familial guardianship' in the Protectorate. In turn, while the Nationalists made no significant alteration in Caliphian powers, they did allow some prestige-enhancing concessions — the autonomy of the Habous administration, the expansion of the Caliphian guard, and Makhzian enforcement of Islamic law — and they ensured that the Caliph would play a key function in most public and religious ceremonies.

While the Spanish Nationalists saw the utility of having the Caliph and his administration in their camp, they did not perceive the Moroccan Nationalists in the same light. The idea of an independent Morocco was repugnant to these men. Moreover, for the Spanish Nationalists the Moroccan Nationalists, as traditional liberals, were no better than the Spanish Republicans. None the less, a wartime situation necessitated compromise, and Franco, Orgaz, and Beigbeder were pragmatic enough to realize that the attraction of the Moroccan Nationalists to their cause would enhance, on the one hand, their position among certain urban indigenous elites and thus be of immense propaganda value; and, on the other hand, would dilute what was already a mild critique of Spain's protectorate administration or at least channel it against the Moroccan Nationalist's bête noire — France.

To accomplish this attraction, Orgaz and later Beigbeder initiated what John Halstead has called a policy of conciliation and division. What this entailed was granting the Moroccan Nationalists certain limited concessions; making them vague promises of future autonomy; and, as Robert Rezette put it, tolerating 'une certaine indépendence verbale'. Coupled with this was the selective funding and favouring of the various Nationalist parties. Thus from October 1936 through the end of the war, Beigbeder adroitly juxtaposed Abdelkaled Torres's National Reform Party (Hizb al-Islah al-Watanî) against Makki Naciri's Moroccan Unity Party (el Wahda el Maghribiya), and to a much lesser degree, Brahim el Ouezzani's Bureau of National Defence (Mekteb ed Difaa el Ouatani).

This ploy proved quite successful. Throughout the war,
Beigbeder was able to play off the rival Moroccan Nationalist parties without totally alienating any of them from the *Alzamiento Nacional*. In the process, he granted just enough of the Moroccan Nationalists' demands (the arabization of indigenous education, the reorganization of Islamic justice, the limitation of the amount of land that non-Moroccans could purchase, a self-censoring free press, etc.) to satisfy them, and at the same time, to make the Spanish administration seem absolutely liberal in comparison to that of the French. As Beigbeder himself assured a French journalist in March 1937, ‘Our tactic is that of imprisoning these Muslims in their own aspirations, while not allowing them to deviate from their own civilization...’\(^{46}\) In short, while the Protectorate’s political mobilization was based to some extent on force and liberal bribes, it was also stimulated by a sophisticated policy of limited political and cultural concessions, propaganda and the exploitation of differing indigenous political viewpoints.

**It was not without justification** that in a letter of March 1938 to Francisco Franco, Beigbeder described the Protectorate as ‘this very calm zone’.\(^ {47}\) Despite Republican propaganda that the Zone’s inhabitants were on the verge of revolt and the initial fears of the Spanish Nationalists themselves, the Protectorate remained a safe haven for rebel activities throughout the Spanish Civil War. Furthermore, as this essay has attempted to demonstrate, the Zone’s value as a staging area and convalescent centre was only one aspect of the part it played in the war effort. In varying degrees its military, economic, and political mobilizations were also of considerable worth to the Spanish Nationalists.

Militarily, it provided 62,000 indigenous recruits for the Spanish Nationalist ranks who were, as the British observer F.H. Mellor wrote, ‘brave, skilful fighters, used to hardships and a severe climate...’\(^ {48}\) Economically, it bolstered the autarchic system that was being established in Nationalist Spain and it furnished considerable quantities of high-grade iron ore that were exchanged for much needed war credits. And politically, it ensured an essentially pliant and cooperative indigenous population whose physical and material assistance to the war effort was equalled by its moral support and its propaganda value.

Despite Spanish Morocco’s small size (20,640 square kilometres), ‘irrational’ subsistence economy, rustic tribal society, and
Fleming: *Spanish Morocco and the Alzamiento Nacional*

precarious geopolitical position — surrounded, as it was by French possessions — its military, economic and political mobilization was a significant contributor to the success of the *Alzamiento Nacional*. In a sense, this assistance can be compared to that which France obtained from its African possessions during the First World War and that which Great Britain secured from its far-flung empire during both the First and Second World Wars.

**Notes**


7. This data was provided to the author by the *Archivo de la Guerra de Liberación, Servicio Histórico Militar* (Madrid) in correspondence dated 6 November 1979 (hereafter referred to as SHM, 6 November 1979). Compare this to the figures furnished by José María Gárate Córdoba, *Alféreces provisionales* (Madrid 1976), 25. See also Joaquín de Soto Montes, ‘Notas para la historia de las fuerzas indígenas del antiguo protectorado de España en Marruecos’, *Revista de Historia Militar*, 35 (1973), 117-154.


9. Arqués, op. cit., 135. Willard C. Frank in ‘Sea Power, Politics and the Onset of the Spanish Civil War, 1936’ (PhD diss., University of Pittsburgh 1969), 103, states that approximately 6,500 men were airlifted into Spain during August 1936. On the other hand, Robert H. Whealey, ‘Foreign Intervention in the Spanish Civil War’, Carr, op. cit., 217-218, notes that from 29 July to 11 October 1936, the Germans transported 13,523 Moroccan troops and 270,000 kilograms of war matériel from Morocco to Andalucia; and Alfredo Kindelán in his *Mis cuadernos de guerra* (Madrid 1945), 21-22, writes that during a 14 day period in late July and early August, 14,000 men, 52 cannon and 283 tons of munitions and war matériel were flown to the Peninsula.

10. La Cierva, op. cit., 199; Thomas, op. cit., 370.

11. For the increase in these units see Sotto Montes, op. cit., 134-154.

12. Martín, op. cit., 175. A 1935 estimate placed the Protectorate’s population at 795,000.

13. La Cierva, op. cit., 199.


15. The author would like to thank Professor Stanley G. Payne of the University of Wisconsin for suggesting this figure.


20. See, for instance, García Figueras, op. cit., 283-284.

21. This is the theme of Robert A. Friedlander, ‘Holy Crusade or Unholy Alliance? Franco’s “National Revolution” and the Moors’, *Southwestern Social Science Quarterly*, 44 (March 1964), 346-356.


23. As noted in *AF* (January 1938), 39-40.


25. Department of Overseas Trade, *Report on Economic and Commercial Conditions in Morocco* (London 1939), 43 (hereafter referred to as *RECCM*, 1939). The exchange rate was continually ‘pegged’ upward: 50 pesetas to the £ in December 1936, 60 pesetas to the £ in September 1937, and 70 pesetas to the £ in February 1939.
26. Inflation rate is based on figures provided in Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Zone de Protectorado, _Anuario Estadístico: 1946_ (Madrid 1947), 276 (hereafter referred to as _AE: 1946_).


29. Ibid., 43; the Caliphian Dahir of 2 April 1938, concerning industrial development in the Protectorate is summarized in _AF_ (May 1938), 236.

30. _RECCM, 1939_, op. cit., 43.


34. The events of 17-18 July 1936 in the Presidios and the Protectorate are presented in admittedly biased detail in Enrique Arqués, op. cit. See also Salvador Fernández Álvarez, _Melilla, la primera en el alzamiento_ (Melilla 1939) and Rafael Fernández de Castro, _Hacia las rutas de una nueva España_ (Melilla 1940).

35. The 300,000 pesetas a month figure is quoted in Halstead, ‘A “Somewhat Machiavellian” Face’, op. cit., 50, ft. 23.

36. For rumours of discontent see _AF_ (October 1936), 531; _AF_ (November 1936), 597-598; _AF_ (April 1937), 213; _AF_ (January 1938), 39; _AF_ (February 1938), 91 notes the Ordinance of 13 January 1938, which strictly regulated the possession of firearms; _AF_ (March 1938), 133; _AF_ (June 1938), 274; _AF_ (August 1938), 336 notes the Ordinance of 29 June 1938, which put a stop to all ‘unauthorized’ manifestations; _AF_ (January 1939), 18 and _AF_ (February 1939), 44.


39. Arqués, op. cit., 58. The following day, 19 July 1936, Franco personally rewarded him with the Spanish army’s supreme decoration, the _Gran Cruz Laureada de San Fernando_. See Francisco Franco Salgado-Araujo, _Mi vida junto a Franco_ (Barcelona 1977), 170-172.

40. See, for instance, the interview given to a Syrian journalist on 1 August 1938, as quoted in _Unidad Marroqui_ and reprinted in _AF_ (August 1938), 338.

41. Note also the interview with Beigbeder in ibid. The Caliphian guard was expanded by the Dahir of 18 November 1936, see _AF_ (January 1936), 41. The reform of the _Habous_ administration which oversaw all religious properties is noted in _AF_ (January 1937), 42; and the reorganization of Islamic justice in the Dahir of 19 October 1938, is noted in _AF_ (December 1938), 407.

42. The mind set of the Spanish africánistas is one of the themes developed in Morales Lezcano, op. cit., 109-150; see also Julio Busquets, _El militar de carrera en España: Estudio de sociología militar_, 2nd ed. (Barcelona 1977).
46. *AF* (April 1937), 213.
47. H.C. Juan Beigbeder to Francisco Franco, 13 March 1938, reprinted in Franco Salgado-Araujo, op. cit., 375.

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