The French Left and the Rif War, 1924-25: Racism and the Limits of Internationalism

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In July 1921, a well-organized militia of Riffian Berbers attacked an invading Spanish army at the hamlet of Anual in north-eastern Morocco. Taking the Spaniards by surprise, they killed 8,000 Spanish soldiers in a week and dealt a stunning blow to Spain’s decade-long effort to turn northern Morocco into a Spanish colony. After this initial victory, the Riffian leader Abd el-Krim organized a regular army, recruited guerrilla auxiliaries, founded a republic and repeatedly defeated Spain’s Army of Africa. By the autumn of 1924, the Riffians had driven the Spanish from the interior and their independent Islamic state had grown so strong that it threatened French imperial interests in the Sultanate and neighbouring Algeria. France responded with border incursions and an economic blockade. After six months of such provocations, the Riffians were goaded into launching an attack, and thus in April 1925, the tiny republic, with a population of 750,000, found itself at war with the world’s predominant land military power. Yet for the next three months, the Riffians remained on the offensive, and as Abd el-Krim’s army approached the gates of Fez, France entered into a military alliance with Spain. In September, the Spanish landed several hundred thousand troops on the Riffian coast at Alhucemas Bay and burned Abd el-Krim’s capital, Ajdir. As the Spanish pushed south, an even larger French force moved north to meet them and cut the Rif in two. The Riffians fought these combined armies of more than half a million men until May 1926, when Abd el-Krim surrendered. Even after their leader’s capitulation, some Riffians continued to fight as guerrillas. It took two more years for the Spanish to subdue the remaining pockets of resistance.

From May to October 1925, the French Communist Party (PCF) led a direct action campaign against the war, organizing hundreds of
meetings and demonstrations, instigating mutinies on half a dozen naval vessels and making several attempts to stop shipments of troops and matériel. The protests reached their climax on 12 October, when several hundred thousand French workers took to the streets in a twenty-four hour general strike. On the morning of the work stoppage, the Minister of Interior placed Paris under a state of siege. There were riots in the Red Belt suburbs of Paris, and at the gates of one suburban factory a young demonstrator was shot and killed.

The PCF's campaign against the Rif War had begun over a year earlier, in September 1924, where the communist youth group, the Fédération des Jeunesses Communistes and its leader, Jacques Doriot, took the first steps to support the Riffians. Until France was actually at war with the Berber Republic, however, the PCF remained deaf to the Jeunesses' appeals for solidarity. Then in May, after news of large-scale fighting in Morocco reached France, PCF moderates joined the 'Doriotistes' in leading the first mass protests, but did not accept Doriot's anti-imperialist political line. Contradictory propaganda and conflicting orders emanated from party centre, reflecting unacknowledged factional differences about the objectives of the movement and the basis for a united front with other groups protesting against the war. They were resolved by the end of the summer of 1925 in a compromise that downplayed anti-colonial demands in favour of anti-militarism. By that time workers had all but abandoned the anti-war movement, but the joint French and Spanish offensive in September touched off a new cycle of popular protest. The PCF's new consensus enabled it to mobilize the 12 October general strike and establish a temporary parliamentary alliance with the socialists and a faction of the Radical Party.

The PCF's behaviour during the Rif War does not fit standard interpretations of the party's early history. Wohl and Kriegel, for example, see its first decade as a period when the PCF was a sect of pariahs with a social base of industrial workers, who were themselves outcasts of French society — 'lepers' is Wohl's term. Kriegel says the PCF saw itself as 'an advanced detachment' of the USSR, 'snipers' harassing the capitalist front from behind enemy lines.' In 1925, such characterizations apply to only a small minority of enrages, the Jeunesses and Doriot. In late May, the Jeunesses captured the leadership of the anti-war movement for a few months. But the parent party rejected the youth group's anti-imperialist programme, and the Jeunesses lost the initiative because it had no independent working-class base. More moderate leaders gradually imposed their own
programme and aligned the PCF with the left wing of the Socialist Party, who wanted a negotiated settlement, not a Riffian victory. The PCF may have been outside the mainstream of the French left, but in 1925 most of its leaders and members acted as if they wanted in.

Despite the PCF’s militant anti-patriotism and the world communist movement’s commitment, in theory, to Lenin’s principle of the right of self-determination for the colonized peoples of Asia and Africa, the party failed to carry out the Third International’s objectives in its campaign against the war. Its efforts were hamstrung by the pervasive contempt for Muslim North Africans, which French communists not only avoided confronting but shared with the rest of French society. By ignoring racial bias in their own ranks, most party leaders perpetuated the racial stereotypes of ‘the Moor’. While the Communist International filtered its support for national liberation through the medium of Soviet state interests, PCF leaders resisted ‘orders from Moscow’ precisely when the Comintern most emphatically insisted that their party take a stand against French colonialism. In private assessments of the state of the movement, party moderates noted the rank and file’s reluctance to get involved in anti-war work and expressed mental reservations about the campaign. In public statements these leaders shied away from expressing support for the Rif Republic or Abd el-Krim, skirted the colonial issues uncovered by the war, and emphasized the anti-militarist theme that workers were dying to make capitalists rich.

White racial superiority and Orientalism, its high-cultural rationale, were aspects of bourgeois hegemony that remained intact even in the midst of Europe’s post-war revolutionary crisis and near-collapse of capitalism. Contempt for colonial peoples, although inconsistent with the left’s world view, penetrated most aspects of French culture. Schools, popular entertainment and newspapers glorified France’s role in the Maghreb and Middle East as a ‘civilizing mission’ and fostered a mentalité that coloured the outlook of all political parties, even the PCF’s pre-war socialist progenitor, the Section Française de l’International Ouvrier (SFIO). After the Agadir Crisis of 1911 and the imposition of a French protectorate over Morocco in 1912, a socialist deputy named Lucien Deslinières proposed a colonization plan to take advantage of the Sultanate’s loss of independence and provide French workers with farms. Although Jean Jaurès and Edward Vaillant pointed out that such proletarian colons would almost certainly clash with natives and the socialists would be responsible, Deslinières’s scheme won favour with
Jules Guesde’s wing of the SFIO, and other social imperialist proposals to solve unemployment at the expense of colonial peoples gained acceptance. The assumption that the benefits of imperialism did or could trickle down to European workers indirectly influenced even the opponents of imperialism, since they argued against colonial expansion on moral rather than political and economic grounds.  

The trauma of the Great War broke the hold of chauvinistic nationalism on the left, but the PCF’s militant anti-patriotism and Bolshevik ideology neither erased nor neutralized the prejudices against North Africans. Brought up in a colonialist cultural milieu, French communists, like the rest of the metropole, had been inculcated with antipathy and contempt for Arabs and Berbers. Long before their encounter with Leninism, they had been exposed to thousands of authoritative messages that depicted Muslims as fanatics and characterized Islamic culture as benighted and irrational. The ideology of French racial superiority emphasized culture more than biology, but erased cultural differences among the natives of its African colonies, stereotyping them as Arabs or Sénégalais, except where other distinctions helped perpetuate colonial rule. Even heroes of the anti-colonial resistance were expropriated to reinforce French superiority, and the surrender of the Algerian leader Abd el-Kader in 1847 was as familiar to French schoolchildren as the story of the Bey of Algiers striking the French ambassador with his fan.  

Even before the pro-Bolshevik elements broke with the Socialist Party at the Congress of Tours in December 1920, ambivalence marked their outlook towards colonial peoples. The eighth of the twenty-one conditions for adherence to the Third International stated that communists of imperialist countries

must ruthlessly denounce the methods of ‘their own’ imperialists in the colonies, supporting, not in words, but in deeds, every independence movement in the colonies. They should demand the expulsion of their own imperialists from such colonies and oppressed nationalities and carry on systematic agitation in its own army against every kind of oppression of the colonial population.  

Two months before the meeting at Tours, the future PCF leader Paul Vaillant-Couturier wrote an article for L’Humanité that offered an example of what the Bolsheviks meant by ‘deeds’. If French workers stopped making and shipping munitions used by the bourgeois government to maintain order among ‘les populations spoliées’, they would be carrying out the eighth condition’s mandate.
At Tours, however, the twenty-one conditions were only partially and imperfectly translated, and the eighth condition was virtually excised.6

Two years later, the PCF’s Algerian federation repudiated the Comintern’s position. Of the party’s 1,000 ‘Algerian’ members, only eighty-nine were Arabs or Berbers; the rest were European settlers, colons, who had been socialists before Tours and had been attracted by the PCF’s militancy. On 20 May 1922, however, the Executive Committee of the Comintern (ECCI) called for the ‘liberation’ of Algeria and Tunisia. Local communists could no longer pretend that French North Africa was an exception to the Comintern’s general stand on colonialism. The PCF’s section in Sidi Bel Abbès, the western Algerian town that served as Foreign Legion headquarters, replied to the ECCI by declaring that native Algerian resistance to colonialism was ‘feudal’ and that the Maghreb’s native people were ‘backward’. The section concluded that French rule was progressive and that independence could come only after the victory of socialism in France. At their next federation congress, all of the PCF’s Algerian sections registered their support of Sidi Bel Abbès’s resolution, rejecting the idea of indigenous self-government with the comment that ‘a dominion of cannibals is not desirable’.7

Despite the resolution’s racism and implicit rejection of Leninism, the PCF leadership took no action against the Algerian sections. But the Comintern leader Dmitri Manuilsky made it the basis for a stinging rebuke, delivered at the Fifth World Congress of the International in July 1924, of the PCF’s ‘social-democratic’ approach to colonial questions. Manuilsky demanded to know why these ‘possibly excellent Frenchmen, but very indifferent communists’ were still in the party, why the PCF had thus far failed to organize the colonial workers and soldiers, why the party had edited out an appeal to the colonial peoples from the text of a Comintern address to the Lyons Congress, and why in the recent elections all seven of the party’s candidates for the Algerian seats in the Chamber were ‘representatives of the ruling race’. At the end of the year, the PCF central committee expelled Sidi Bel Abbès’s recalcitrants for violating Comintern discipline. But it neither challenged their view of Algerian rights nor scrutinized the attitudes of its other Algerian members, which foreshadowed its response to the Rif War and suggests that racism in the party was not confined to its sections on the southern shores of the Mediterranean.8

For Manuilsky, the colonial issue was entwined with ‘Bolshevization’, the reorganization of the PCF’s structure that he
had been conducting personally since early 1924. As an old Bolshevik and leading figure of the ECCI, his views carried considerable weight in the PCF. Under his direction, the PCF had changed its basic party unit from neighbourhood sections to factory cells, rooting out ‘parliamentary cretinism’ and other vestiges of pre-war socialist party organization. Despite the disruption of daily work and defection of several thousand members, the PCF rank and file accepted Bolshevization.9 But neither Manuilsky’s nor the Comintern’s authority made the PCF’s cadre more receptive to anti-colonialism. To carry out the task of ‘Bolshevizing’ the PCF’s colonial policy, the ECCI turned to the Jeunesses Communistes and Jacques Doriot.

On 11 September 1924, Doriot inaugurated a campaign to strengthen the PCF’s anti-imperialist credentials by sending a telegram of support to Abd el-Krim. In the name of the party, Pierre Semard, General Secretary of the PCF and a high-ranking ECCI member, also signed the statement. It hailed the recent Riffian victory at Xauen, which had forced the Spanish armies to evacuate the interior and withdraw to coastal enclaves around the ports of Ceuta and Melilla. It also expressed the hope that the Riffians would continue fighting until ‘Moroccan soil was completely liberated’ from both Spanish and French imperialism. L’Humanité printed the communique the next day; an accompanying editorial called on party members and French workers to support the Riffians. But its appeal to ‘break decisively with the slavemaster colonial position of the social democrats’ implied that many in and around the party had not.10

That autumn, Doriot and the Jeunesses began a drive to recruit North African immigrants, 50,000 of whom lived in Paris and an equal number in Marseilles. To direct them, the ECCI sent another agent to France, known to the police as ‘Stéphane’. He was probably Stoian Mineff, also known as ‘Stepanov’, a Bulgarian with longstanding ties to the PCF.11 This organizing drive culminated on 7 December in a congress of North African workers of the Paris region. While Doriot called for solidarity with the Rif Republic and the evacuation of French troops from Morocco, the immigrants had more immediate goals in mind. The Algerian delegates emphasized demands for democratic rights in France, such as equal pay for equal work, but the final resolutions of the congress ignored their demands for equal treatment in France. Although not specifically mandated by the Comintern’s eighth condition, pay equity was a demand in keeping with the spirit of European workers making concrete acts of solidarity with colonial peoples. Ironically, Doriot’s ‘revolutionary’
pronouncement in favour of self-determination for the Rif reflected the ambivalence of the PCF leadership. It was easier to mobilize colonial immigrants than to confront the racist attitudes of party members directly or reorient the PCF's daily work to emphasize the struggle for equal rights.\(^\text{12}\)

In late December 1924, Doriot addressed the Jeunesses' annual congress and warned his comrades of an impending crisis in Morocco. He noted that the Resident General of the French Protectorate, Maréchal Louis Hubert Lyautey, had reinforced its northern border and demanded that all French troops be evacuated from Morocco. Since Doriot thought it unlikely that the PCF would dissuade the government from its aggressive plans, he urged the Jeunesses to prepare an extra-legal campaign to neutralize the army by promoting fraternization between French troops and the Rifians.

Encouraging mass fraternization between enemy soldiers as a means of ending an unjust, capitalist war held an honourable place in the traditions of the internationalist left. Since the Franco-Prussian War there had been sporadic attempts to employ a 'strike' by frontline soldiery as a means of imposing peace. The informal truces of the Great War and the 1919 mutiny of France's Black Sea fleet, which had blocked French aid to the Whites in the Russian Civil War, were considered glorious chapters in the founding of the party, and the leader of the Black Sea sailors, André Marty, had become a key figure in the PCF and hero to many on the left. In 1923, the Jeunesses had organized clandestine cells in the army occupying the Ruhr. They had encouraged French soldiers to refuse to fire on striking workers and in other ways had eased the burden of occupation on German civilians.\(^\text{13}\)

Doriot had played a central role in the Ruhr campaign, and in early 1925 he anticipated using similar tactics to disrupt French military operations in Morocco. This time, however, there was no unanimity within the PCF or outside support. PCF leaders who had boldly urged French troops to fraternize with the population of France's hereditary enemy kept silent in 1925. Cachin, for example, had loudly condemned 'French imperialism', a phrase he rarely used during the Rif War. Most PCF leaders did not believe that Berber tribesmen would react to an invitation to fraternize in the same way as Russian Bolsheviks or German coal-miners. During the Rif War, some communists and the entire SFIO repeatedly objected to the tactic.\(^\text{14}\)

Doriot first proposed fraternization to the entire party in mid-January, at its five-day congress in Clichy. But the Politburo left the
entire discussion of the Rif War to the closing hours of the last day and its final resolution said nothing about fraternization, offering the Riffians only the vaguest assurances of support. The central committee created a central colonial commission, appointed Doriot chair, and ended the paternalistic practice of shunting all colonial immigrants who joined the PCF into the Jeunesses, but it took no further steps toward equality. The contrast between the PCF’s reaction to the Jeunesses’ campaigns in the Ruhr and the Rif suggests that racism was a more formidable obstacle to international solidarity than nationalism.\textsuperscript{15}

Until the actual outbreak of fighting between France and the Rif, Doriot campaigned against French intervention alone, while other PCF leaders avoided him and his message. In early February 1925, Doriot wrote a series of articles in \textit{L’Humanité} condemning the mass circulation press for whipping up war fever. He singled out the papers subsidized by the government, a moderate left coalition led by Edouard Herriot. In May 1924, when Herriot’s Cartel des Gauches had taken power, Doriot was in prison serving a sentence for his role in the Jeunesses’ Ruhr activities. He had been elected to the Chamber of Deputies by Saint Denis, the reddest of Paris’s ‘Red Belt’ suburbs, partly to secure his release. On 4 February 1925, Doriot mounted the podium of the Chamber to ‘interpellate’ the government on its Morocco policy. He denounced Lyautey’s occupation of the border region and his blockade of the Ouergha River valley, the traditional granary of the Rif. He accused Herriot and the socialists, who without joining the cabinet were participating in the Cartel parliamentary coalition, of complicity in Lyautey’s plans. The blockade had left the Riffians with no alternative but to starve or fight, Doriot concluded, and war would break out by the spring.\textsuperscript{16}

Doriot’s speech of 4 February incited a riotous storm of protest from the deputies. As he read the notorious September 1924 telegram to Abd el-Krim, cries of ‘traitor!’ erupted throughout the Chamber. When he condemned the socialists for giving the Cartel a ‘blank cheque’ to make war, a Cartellist deputy from Algeria (a \textit{colon}, of course) leapt to their defence shouting, ‘the socialists want the natives to love France; you want them to hate her.’ Doriot read military dispatches revealing that the army had been shelling civilians and burning crops in the Ouergha valley. The deputies ignored the genocidal import of the reports and demanded Doriot’s arrest for disclosing military secrets. He produced a photograph of a French officer displaying the severed heads of Berber captives on a table and
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challenged the Chamber to reconcile the ugly realities of French colonialism with the myth of a ‘civilizing mission’. The next day, Doriot introduced a motion to cut off all military funds for Morocco. He was accused, by the Socialists as well as the Radicals and the right, of inviting the massacre of French civilians in Morocco. Only the four representatives of a left-socialist splinter party joined the twenty-six PCF deputies in supporting his proposal. The SFIO’s one hundred deputies abstained; the rest of the Chamber, 325 deputies ranging from the Radicals to the extreme right, unanimously swept the resolution away.

The war Doriot had predicted broke out on the heels of a scandal that brought down the Herriot government. Through deceptive accounting, the finance minister had concealed the government’s deficits and overborrowed from the Banque de France. The Chamber discovered the manipulations, Herriot resigned on 11 April, and on the 15th a new cabinet led by Paul Painlevé was installed. The new ministry reflected a shift to the right, but the SFIO’s Comité Administratif Permanent (CAP) decided to remain in the Cartel des Gauches coalition. Painlevé was a close friend and political ally of Horace Finaly, chairman of the Banque de Paris et Pays Bas (Paribas). It was rumoured that Finaly was also the éminence grise who had orchestrated the Cartel’s electoral victory in May 1924, as well as Herriot’s fall and Painlevé’s rise. Finaly’s bank also directed the financial consortium which dominated foreign investment in Morocco. Doriot had repeatedly called attention to Paribas’s role in shaping French policy in Morocco, and it does seem more than coincidental that, within days of Painlevé taking office, a full-scale war erupted. Border clashes had been gradually escalating for months, however, and Lyautey’s blockade, fortifications, reinforcements and aggressive patrols had invited and provoked the confrontation.

For the first month of the fighting, official explanations designated the conflict as nothing more than a few border skirmishes. But on 14 May, L’Humanité reported that 100,000 French troops were engaged along a 200 kilometre front in what amounted to a full-scale war. The PCF held the first rally of the protest campaign on 17 May, drawing 15,000 Parisians to Luna Park. PCF leaders asked the Paris left to dedicate the annual commemoration of the Paris Commune, the march to the Mur des Fédérés, to a protest against the war. SFIO leaders refused to participate and held a separate ceremony on 24 May. As the SFIO contingents filed out of Père Lachaise cemetery, they were met by 20,000 jeering demonstrators including several
thousand left socialists and CGT members. During the next two months, the PCF drew more than 50,000 people to hundreds of meetings in the provinces. But a close inspection of this activity reveals that the protests did not spread beyond the PCF’s existing base. Many of the local meetings were held in communist strongholds: ‘red’ suburbs like Halluin (Lille) and Saint Pierre des Corps (Tours) or small towns like Oyonnax, near the Swiss border, and Douarnenez, a Breton coastal town where the PCF had helped local fishermen and women cannery workers win a bitter strike the previous winter.20

Although mass protests spread through many parts of France and the numbers of participants grew during May and June, a PCF politburo meeting held on 29 May noted the reluctance of many party cells to throw themselves into an all-out campaign against the war. Footdragging was most noticeable in the provinces, where the party leaders did not directly supervise day-to-day work. Provincial leaders resisted the unpopular directives from the Centre, even though backed by the authority of the Comintern, because Bolshevization had tried the patience and strained the loyalty of the rank and file. The turmoil had barely subsided when the Centre demanded this new commitment that diverted time and energy away from practical, local work.21

Moreover, in the early stages of the war the ultra-left ‘Doriotistes’ determined the tactics and strategy of the party’s protest campaign and many party moderates did not share their politics. Doriot’s strategy rejected a united front with the SFIO leadership, which had continued to support the government prosecuting the war. Regardless of which group controlled the Chamber, he argued, Paribas directed French policy in the Protectorate and reaped profits for monopoly capital at the expense of both French and Moroccan working peoples. Doriot wanted French workers to perform concrete acts of solidarity, to fraternize on the battlefield, strike war production plants and stop the transport of troops and matériel. The PCF would lead these actions, forge an anti-imperialist alliance between the French workers and the Rifians and force a total French military evacuation of Morocco.22

The Doriotiste programme exemplified ‘revolutionary defeatism’. On 2 June, L’Humanité identified the names and military capabilities of units sent to Morocco, and even the socialists accused the PCF of giving aid to the enemy. The Jeunesses held ‘vin d’adieu’ ceremonies for draftees where they urged soldiers sent to Morocco to band
together and refuse to fight. Organizers explained to recruits that ‘in uniform you represent the oppressor’ who was invading the Rifian homeland. To initiate fraternization, therefore, they were obliged to take the first step. In a *L’Humanité* article, André Marty encouraged front-line troops to display coloured strips of cloth that approximated the Rifian flag, a red field with gold crescent and blue star. Abd el-Krim’s men would understand the gesture, he hinted.23

French military personnel did resist the war, but in ways that could not properly be described as fraternization and which fell far short of the Jeunesses’ expectations. Aware of how politically explosive mounting casualties would be, Painlevé sent few draftees to Morocco and even fewer into combat.24 Recruits had little contact with Moroccan civilians, and the army quickly extinguished the resistance of a few company-strength units of Muslim North African mercenaries that refused to go into combat. The Jeunesses had more success with the fleet patrolling the Rif’s Mediterranean coast, whose gun crews in some cases refused to fire on coastal villages and other obviously civilian targets. Half a dozen heavy and light cruisers reported firemen and stokers who vented the boilers and becalmed their ships in protest against intolerable working and living conditions. The Jeunesses were able to politicize these protests by injecting anti-war slogans, but the sailors were mainly concerned with the extreme heat of the engine room, lack of water and relief below, rotten food, double watches and long tours of sea duty. Trained seamen were drafted for three years, while soldiers served only two, and resentment over this inequality underlay the immediate complaints. As soon as shipboard ‘incidents’ erupted, however, the navy recalled vessels, rotated crews and arrested the hard-core resisters. By the end of July, the admiralty had stopped the protests by throwing more than a hundred sailors into the brig at Toulon. They were court-martialed and sentenced to between one- and five-year prison terms.25

In large part, the success of fraternization was limited because the government relied on colonial mercenaries and career soldiers and because the PCF had no direct communication with the Rif Republic. But the tactic also illustrates the sectarian flaw in the Doriotiste programme for opposing the war, which excluded from the anti-war united front all those who would not accept fraternization or the demand for immediate French military evacuation of Morocco. Doriotiste propaganda identified the socialist leaders as the enemy and urged the SFIO rank and file to abandon them. On the other
hand, Doriotism ignored French racism. Marty, the PCF leader whose position on the war and fraternization was closest to Doriot's, had confronted the rumour that the Riffians were cannibals, but dismissed the notion as absurd, without acknowledging that it was implicit in French racial stereotypes of Muslims and that it had cropped up in the PCF's Algerian sections. The Jeunesses 'Westernized' and 'laicized' Abd el-Krim and the Rif Republic, but neither recognized nor bridged the cultural gap, differences in way of life, and disparities of wealth and power between metropolitan French and Riffians. Before the war began, the Jeunesses had not educated French workers or the PCF about the relationship between domestic monopoly capitalism and imperial expansion. The painstaking process of drawing lessons from the workers' own experience never began, and once war broke out, the Comintern pressed for immediate mobilization. In the face of what seemed to be the imminent defeat of French imperialism in Morocco, the ECCI could not understand why the PCF was unable to arouse more opposition, particularly among dockers, seamen and railway workers, who could stop the shipment of troops and supplies. In mid-June it called Doriot and Marcel Cachin to Moscow and demanded an explanation.

Cachin's point of view, as reflected in his speeches and articles, represented the moderate wing of the PCF. Trade union officials, provincial party leaders and those like Cachin with roots in the pre-war SFIO, shared his outlook, which ignored the Riffians, downplayed imperialism, and reverted to Jaurèsian anti-militarism in its appeals to French workers. The PCF was notoriously weak on Marxist theory, and the colonial question cracked its Leninist veneer. Before April, party 'regulars' had kept their distance from Doriot's campaign. Once the war came, they sidestepped colonial issues and opposed the war on the grounds that the government was sacrificing workers' sons to make French war profiteers rich. Cachin's rhetoric in particular played on public fears that war in Morocco would renew great power rivalries, replay the Agadir Crisis and lead to another world war. The emphasis Cachin and other moderates placed on this scenario actually painted the PCF into a corner. In June, the great powers signed the Geneva Convention, and the 'spirit of Locarno' descended over their relations. Moreover, as the Painlevé government was able to meet its need for troops with career soldiers, colonial mercenaries and Legionnaires, the demagogic words of the PCF moderates lost their mass appeal.
Pure and simple anti-militarism, with its anti-capitalist justifications, thinly disguised the PCF moderates’ unwillingness to support the Rifians. Doriot took the position that while the Rif Republic was not socialist, it was anti-imperialist, opposed French capitalism, and was therefore the natural ally of the French working class. In Moscow, Comintern leaders endorsed Doriot’s position, calling him a ‘true Bolshevik’ and labelling Cachin an ‘incorrigible social democrat’. Embracing ‘bourgeois nationalists’ of the Islamic world as allies of the Western proletariat suited Soviet interests at this time. In mid-1925, Islamic nationalists were taking the offensive against European imperialism throughout the Middle East. The Wafd was threatening the pro-British government of Egypt with a general strike and insurrection. Iranian nationalists were fighting British-backed separatists for control of the oil region. Anti-British, anti-Zionist riots erupted in Palestine, while guerrillas in the Yemeni and Arabian deserts consolidated their bases. In February, nationalists founded the Syrian People’s Party and set out to overthrow the French mandate. By allying themselves with these movements, the Soviets offset their isolation in Europe and legitimated their rule over the Muslims within the USSR. Doriot’s support for Abd el-Krim lent credibility to Soviet and Comintern claims of support for Islamic nationalism.

The Doriotiste influence reached its peak at the 5–6 July Congress of Workers and Peasants of the Paris Region. Twenty-five hundred delegates, whom L’Humanité claimed represented a million workers in the Department of the Seine, unanimously ratified the ‘maximalist’ programme: the evacuation of Morocco, fraternization, strikes of arsenal workers, a ‘boycott’ of military transport by dockers, railway workers and seamen, and, if all else failed, a general strike against the war. This programme was almost entirely a bluff. Most railroad and arsenal workers were members of conservative, socialist-led CGT unions, unlikely candidates for the role assigned to them. The PCF also had no influence in several key ports, including Bordeaux, where the socialist mayor made sure nothing interrupted the flow of troops and supplies.

But the absence of a mass base did not dissuade the PCF left from its grandiose plans. The party had created a ‘Comité central d’action contre la guerre’ as a national co-ordinating committee, and two days before the Paris Congress, the Politburo selected Maurice Thorez to preside. With the approval of Doriot, Suzanne Girault and the Comintern representative Guralsky (‘Lepetit’), the Nord miners’
union leader got his first chance to play a national role. As Girault explained to the central committee on 13 July, the post called for someone who could devote all his energy to the campaign, was a disciplined communist and was not well known, since notoriety might hamper efforts to form a united front.34 Despite Girault’s nicety about unity, Thorez’s keynote speech at the Paris Congress was more Doriotiste than Doriot’s. He repeated verbatim several passages from the eighth of the Comintern’s twenty-one principles of unity, calling for fraternization and ‘deeds, not just words’ of solidarity with the Rifians.35 Later that summer he advocated an entirely different plan for resisting the war.

During this Doriotiste phase of the anti-war movement, however, the PCF politburo was pursuing a united front ‘from below’ and called for the CGT and SFIO to participate in the Paris Congress by means of open letters in which the evacuation and fraternization slogans figured prominently. The SFIO CAP categorically rejected co-operation on the grounds that such measures, indeed even the slogans, would invite a massacre of Europeans in Morocco. The CAP’s alarmism, stimulated by racist fears, led it to threaten socialists who joined the PCF’s action committees with expulsion. Although the PCF neither confronted nor allayed these fears, it reaped the benefit of attracting thousands of left-wing SFIO and CGT members in the Paris region to the Mur des Fédérés demonstration. After sixty-three socialist deputies voted with the government on 23 June, during the Chamber’s first full debate of the war, the Paris-based L’Étincelle socialiste excoriated them; and while its leader, Jean Zyromski, would not break party discipline to attend the Paris congress, 250 representatives from the socialist camp did participate and, apparently, voted for its resolutions.36

L’Étincelle, the Union Socialiste/Communiste, a splinter party with four deputies in the Chamber, and La Révolution prolétarienne, a journal published by PCF defectors, held a common point of view: ‘neither Lyautey nor Abd el-Krim’. In the abstract they supported self-determination for the Rif but to varying degrees suspected the Rif Republic of being a vehicle for Abd el-Krim’s ambitions to become a feudal potentate. These splinter groups and the left socialists were attractive allies to the PCF moderates, and Cachin had called for co-operation with them. Without mentioning names, but apparently in response to Cachin, Guralsky had criticized an ‘overly comprehensive’ definition of united front and argued that ‘our proposals will always be rejected by the socialists, but they allow us to denounce their leaders’.37
This sectarian reaction to the SFIO had a social as well as a political basis. Since the schism at Tours, the SFIO rump’s industrial working-class constituency had dwindled, while a new base of professionals, salaried employees and small businessmen had grown by leaps and bounds. To compete with the Radicals for the votes of the petite bourgeoisie and for leadership of the entire moderate left, the SFIO began to adopt the Radical programme, including its colonial policy. Under Jaurès’s leadership, the pre-war SFIO had opposed colonial expansion because it heightened tensions in Europe. After Tours, however, the SFIO remnants joined the Radicals in defending the Empire. On 23 June 1925, more than half the socialist deputies voted with the government, accepting Painlevé’s claim that France had responded to an unprovoked attack by a feudal pretender to the Sultan’s throne leading a horde of Muslim fanatics. To accept any other interpretation of the Rif War would have been tantamount to a vote of no-confidence and would have ruptured the Cartel.

To justify their support of Painlevé’s policy, SFIO leaders indulged in starkly racist rhetoric. Pierre Renaudel allowed that France should eventually end its military occupation but not its ‘civilizing mission among the inferior races’. When Gratien Candace, an Afro-Caribbean deputy from the Antilles and a protégé of Jaurès, suggested he substitute the word ‘backward’ for inferior, Renaudel ignored him.38 Léon Blum expressed the same sentiments:

We admit the right and even the duty of superior races to bring the same degree of culture to those who have not succeeded in achieving it, and to summon them to progress realized thanks to the achievements of science and industry.39

The SFIO’s cantankerous left, under-represented in the party’s parliamentary fraction, noisily condemned their deputies’ efforts to supplant the Radicals as an opportunistic abandonment of the principles of Jaurès.30 Trying to maintain party unity while sliding to the right, the deputies suffered an embarrassing upset on 9 June, when Doriot disclosed the contents of a purloined letter written a few weeks before by Lyautey’s private secretary, Paul Vatin-Perignon, to the Maréchal’s nephew, Pierre. The full text, which Doriot read to the Chamber, included revelations that Herriot had approved Lyautey’s occupation of the Ouergha in December 1924, that Blum and several other socialist deputies had been informed of the provocative measure at the time and that Lyautey had been manipulating French public opinion for years by feeding stories to friendly editors and journalists through conduits like Pierre. Thus the SFIO deputies
unwittingly helped to shield Lyautey and Herriot from public scrutiny and parliamentary accountability.\(^4\)

The SFIO repaid the PCF for Doriot’s exposé. On 17 June, the Chamber’s military and foreign affairs committees met in closed, joint session. The socialists joined the other parties in banning PCF deputies from the meeting because they were a ‘security risk’. Behind closed doors, Renaudel criticized the ineffectiveness of the army’s machine-gunnery and offered helpful suggestions for improving field tactics. The SFIO remained silent when rightists urged Painlevé to bomb Riffian villages with poison gas, justifying the violation of the Geneva Convention on the grounds that the Riffians were ‘rebels’.\(^4\)

On 31 July, Painlevé named Alexandre Varenne, a right-wing socialist deputy, governor-general of Indochina. When he accepted the post, the SFIO left wing forced him to resign from the party on the grounds that he was engaging in ‘ministerialism’. Their case against Varenne reveals that the left did not oppose colonialism per se. Along with the rest of the SFIO, the left assumed that non-Europeans were incapable of governing themselves and that home rule should come only after a long period of French tutelage. In the interim, the left advocated reforming the abuses of the colonial regimes and gradually extending French citizenship to the peoples of the Empire. Assimilation became a means for Blum, Paul Faure and other centrist leaders to unify the SFIO’s colonial policy and reconcile the party’s factions. Within a few years the policy became an anachronism, however, as the Empire’s subjects began demanding independence.\(^4\)

Two other elements of the socialist left joined the parliamentary fraction in opposing Riffian independence, the CGT and the socialist colons of Morocco. Like the Socialist Party itself, the CGT had undergone a social transformation since the split and the formation of the PCF-led union confederation, the CGTU, in 1921. The numbers of clerks, teachers, civil servants (fonctionnaires) and state railway workers in the ranks were growing, while the CGT’s influence among blue-collar workers was declining. In the mid-1920s, the CGT adopted nativist, anti-immigrant policies, possibly to retain the loyalty of its shrinking industrial proletarian base. CGT and business leaders framed the National Manpower Council Act, which socialist deputies then guided through the Chamber. Passed in mid-July 1925, at the height of the Rif War, the law legalized and institutionalized the status of migrants as last hired and first fired in manufacturing jobs, or channelled them into low-paying, seasonal labour in agriculture and the extracting industries. Immigrants became shock absorbers,
cushioning French workers from the impact of the business cycle. At the same time, the jobs of skilled French workers were protected from imported labour. The passage of the Act coincided with a shift in immigration from northern to southern Europe and North Africa. The number of Belgians and other northern Europeans working in France declined between 1921 and 1931 from 590,000 to 500,000, while the number of Poles, Spaniards, Italians and North Africans increased from 1.0 to 2.2 million. The 150,000 Maghrebbin in France had the lowest paid, least secure, most dangerous jobs of all the migrants. Algerians were French 'subjects' not citizens, and neither Tunisians nor Moroccans had an independent home government to protect their rights. Their wanderings were part of the larger economic dynamic of colonialism. Often defrauded of their land by colons, they went to France to earn enough money to buy back their plot of ancestral soil. Despite their pretensions to internationalism, neither the communists nor the left socialists criticized the CGT’s nativist industrial strategy or the racial oppression of North Africans.

The SFIO parliamentary fraction also allied with Radical and socialist colons of Morocco in their campaign to remove Lyautey as Resident General. The Maréchal’s policy of indirect rule protected the privileges of the Sultan and traditional Moroccan élite to secure their co-operation with the development plans of the big French consortiums. Lyautey discouraged immigration because petits colons upset the equilibrium of the arrangements that gave stability to the Protectorate. When he could not keep them out, he forced them to compete with indigenous merchants and farmers on equal terms. With none of the big investors’ advantages, the ‘small sharks’ clamoured loudly that the Protectorate was violating their rights. They joined the Radical Party, the SFIO and the Ligue des Droits de l'Homme (LDH) to fight for a free press, voting rights, land grants and business concessions, but applied the Rights of Man to Europeans only, in effect demanding the same right to exploit the Moroccans as the big colons. Lyautey stood squarely in their way. The more conservative SFIO deputies, still enamoured of colonization schemes that would turn Morocco into a settler state like Algeria, supported them, and when the military setbacks and Vatin-Perignon letter damaged Lyautey’s credibility, the big colons abandoned the Maréchal. In July he relinquished command of the army and a month later resigned. Maréchal Philippe Pétain, who represented the colonial lobby’s hawks, took charge of operations.
Despite their public commitment to a negotiated settlement, the socialists played into the hands of those colonial hardliners who were determined to destroy the Rif Republic. Whether the socialists made an unwitting error or an intentional deal with the advocates of a purely military solution is not clear, but on 2 October Painlevé appointed a civilian Radical, Théodore Steeg, as Resident-General. The selection was intended to win moderate socialist support for the prime minister’s Morocco policy.  

The colonists of Morocco, like European settlers in Algeria, South Africa and Palestine, set themselves up as experts on ‘their natives’. Emile Kahn and Henri Guernut, spokesmen for the SFIO and LDH sections in Morocco, warned that removing French troops from the Protectorate would lead to a massacre of Europeans. Through constant repetition they also reinforced the racist stereotype of Muslims which claimed that they only understood force, and that therefore the Rifians would interpret an offer to negotiate or any other conciliatory gesture as a sign of weakness. The socialist press reiterated these remarks, but the newspapers subsidized by the Cartel went even further, using them to justify military action. They joined the rightist dailies in urging the government to spurn peace talks and force the Rif Republic into submission. As Le Radical wrote: ‘It is necessary to tie up dangerous animals.’ L’Ere nouvelle’s editors wrote nine ‘frenzied’ articles calling for massive aerial bombing. And L’Oeuvre, echoing the deputies of the right, proposed that the Geneva Convention banning the use of poison gas, signed on 17 June 1925, be amended to exclude colonial rebels.  

In July and August, the French army contained the Rifian military advance, and the domestic protest movement ground to a halt. With the SFIO rank and file rendered impervious to the PCF’s propaganda and tactics, the anti-war movement attracted few workers who were not already in the communist fold. To recapture the success of the Paris anti-war congress, the PCF held similar meetings in five regional centres — Lille, Lyons, Beziers, Marseilles and Bordeaux. Four thousand delegates, whom the PCF claimed represented a million provincial workers, attended these meetings and ratified the 5 July programme. But as a group of dissidents said after the 12 October general strike, party leaders were practising ‘the politics of bluff’ in using these congresses as a mandate for the strike. In fact, in every region but Marseilles, the meetings marked the decline of the protest movement, not the opening of a new phase of activity.
Even before the tide of mass action had begun to ebb, André Marty complained of protest meetings that were poorly planned and overly dependent on the party’s ‘stars’ to draw crowds. The party lacked sustained organizing work, Marty said, and the absence of efforts to raise consciousness about the war were most glaring in the provinces. But the same weaknesses affected Paris as well. He believed that ‘bourgeois pacifism’ was the source of these organizational problems, the tendency of the PCF rank and file to equate Abd el-Krim with Lyautey and to see the war as a contest between feudalists and imperialists. The ‘Sidi Bel Abbès outlook’ remained embedded in the party’s culture.

The isolation of the communists doing anti-war work in the heat of late summer brought arrests and police raids down on their heads. Repression discredited the Doriotistes but they still resisted the moderate tactic of submerging their anti-imperialist demands in order to gain the confidence of the rest of the French left. Pressure to change the party’s line grew, however. In mid-July the ECCI, perhaps in response to the initial success of the Locarno talks, asked the PCF to broaden the anti-war campaign by adding slogans that would promote trade union unity and defend the USSR against the ‘conspiracies’ of the Western powers. On 28 July, the PCF central committee urged party cadres to seek the co-operation of the socialists in opposing the war. That directive evidently went too far for Guralsky, who met the next day with the communists on the Comité central d’action contre la guerre. The committee headquarters had been raided by the police a few days before, and one of its members had turned over its records to the arresting officers. Furious, Guralsky spared no one on the committee from his scathing criticism. Their propaganda lacked psychological finesse and their actions lacked courage, he said, while local party members had made themselves too visible in the local action committees, making it easy for the police to single them out. Local organizers should work behind the scenes, he ordered, and the central action committee should stop compromising the movement by pursuing the ‘chimera of unity’ with the social democrats. Yet in early August Doriot addressed a meeting of 350 PCF cell secretaries and told them that immediate peace and evacuation were a sufficient basis for unity. Even without the fraternization slogan, however, he knew that few socialists would accept such a programme.

Despite the PCF’s influence within the CGTU, its unions had hesitated to participate in the anti-war protests and their growing
reluctance to get involved was another indication of the movement’s decline. While the *unitaires* endorsed the PCF’s call for a general strike at their national convention in Paris on 30 August, they did so in the vaguest possible terms. The CGTU leaders had planned their national meeting to coincide with the CGT’s and sent a delegation to the CGT convention with an invitation to co-operate in opposing the war. The *cégétistes* voted to refuse the emissaries permission to address the assembly and ejected them from the hall. The rebuff heightened tension between the PCF and CGTU leaders. Most rank and file *unitaires*, like their CGT counterparts, objected to the injection of politics into trade unions, and if the PCF turned the CGTU’s energies away from the business of improving wages and conditions, the rank and file might desert to the rival confederation. Four times in September the CGTU leaders met to assess the prospects for a general strike, and the reports from the constituent federations grew progressively more pessimistic. Even the most politically militant workers, the Paris region metallurgists, were divided over the war and would obey orders to strike only to preserve unity. The dockers claimed to have not a sou in their strike fund. Railroad leaders could hope for no more than a symbolic, one-hour action, and their men were hopelessly outnumbered by a hostile CGT transport union. Parisian anarchist construction workers, fascinated by the Sorelian myth, threatened to initiate a premature, independent action.53

Immediately after the union confederation conventions, the ECCI received a report from Joany Berlioz, the Paris representative of the Red International of Labour Unions, reviewing the entire anti-war campaign. Berlioz said that the campaign had failed because French workers ‘despised’ Arabs and were even more contemptuous of the Riffian Berbers. The war had cost France little in blood or taxes and had not sparked a dangerous incident among the great powers. The evacuation and fraternization slogans had alienated many workers, reduced the influence of the SFIO left, and allowed Blum and Faure to overcome *L’Etincelle*’s challenge to their leadership. Berlioz wanted the PCF to postpone the general strike and confine itself to partial actions for a year, until the exactions of the war made workers angry enough to override the SFIO’s veto on direct action.54 Marty read the results of the summer’s events differently. In his eyes, a vanguard of supporters of the Rif Republic had coalesced within the party. This group could continue to defend the Riffians’ right of self-determination while it proceeded to build a wider movement.55
In September, there was new urgency to resolve this multi-sided debate over the direction of the anti-war movement. A domestic economic crisis was brewing, France and Spain had invaded the Rif and a nationalist uprising erupted in the French mandate of Syria. Guralsky and Thorez, who was by then an ‘homme de confiance de l'Internationale’, achieved a new political synthesis that attributed the French economic crisis, inflation, debt and reductions in social services to the colonial wars. At a CGTU executive board meeting on 24 September, Thorez suggested adding to the Comité central d'action list of demands an across-the-board wage increase to offset the effects of tax increases and inflation. The proposal struck a chord. The cost of living index (1914 = 100) had risen from 230 to 390 between 1919 and 1925, an average of twenty-three points a year. In 1925–26 it shot up by ninety-five points, and the price of foodstuffs rose even more sharply. The army was spending tens of millions of francs per week to field 250,000 men in the Rif, yet just a few weeks before the invasion, finance minister Joseph Caillaux had negotiated a multi-billion dollar loan from the Morgan Bank to shore up the currency.

On 30 September, following Thorez’s lead, the PCF central committee instructed its anti-war agitators to call for the cancellation of a nine billion franc tax increase. This revenue was earmarked to service the debt and pay for the wars. In effect, the communists had adopted the SFIO’s demand for a tax on capital, which the socialists had been trying to enact since the formation of the Cartel. The socialist left reasserted itself and on 8 October, just two days after the Chamber reconvened and four days before the PCF called the general strike, the SFIO CAP announced that the party’s deputies would no longer vote with the Cartel until the government ended the wars, imposed a tax on capital and restored the money it had cut from the welfare and social insurance budgets.

In pragmatic terms, the Thorez–Guralsky gambit worked. Miners, textile mill hands and Paris mass transit workers, in all about 250,000 workers, joined the 12 October strike. The PCF moderates made the strike a peaceful, symbolic protest, which was punctuated by sporadic rioting in Saint Denis and nearby Paris suburbs. The violence was the last hurrah of the diehard Jeunesses and their quixotic attempt to stop production and turn the strike into an insurrection. After the strike, the PCF submerged the Doriotistes, clearing the way for a coalition of the PCF, SFIO and left Radicals, a ‘neo-Cartel’ that foreshadowed the Popular Front. The invasion of the Rif had shattered Painlevé’s
pretence of a defensive war, and this new alignment demanded a negotiated settlement. Aristide Briand, who formed a new government in November 1925, easily outmanoeuvred the left, however, and the army crushed the Rifians in the spring. Abd el-Krim surrendered on 26 May 1926, and in July the franc collapsed, in part as a result of the sudden cooling of the superheated war economy. To resolve the crisis, Poincaré placed himself at the head of a new Union sacrée, a national unity coalition government. The left had no credible alternative.

The PCF moderates’ temporary parliamentary coalition with the pro-colonial socialists and left Radicals closed the door on what Thorez had described on 5 July as ‘a united front between the metropolitan workers and colonial slaves’. Moscow’s desire to end Soviet isolation in Europe may be what prompted the PCF to opt for an alliance with social democracy and abandon the Rifians. Nevertheless, from the Fifth World Congress to July 1925, the ECCI had pushed in the opposite direction and may have decided that French workers were so reflexively racist that they would reject a united front with colonial nationalists automatically. Yet the PCF gave workers scant opportunity to choose an anti-imperialist course. Mired in the racial attitudes of their society, French communists ignored or misinterpreted Doriot’s anti-imperialist message. Their racism was not imported from Moscow, it was home-grown, which tends to confirm one aspect of the historical consensus that the party’s indigenous roots aided its ‘implantation’ but hindered its ‘Bolshevization’.

The PCF’s predilection for alliance with the metropolitan middle classes over solidarity with the ‘colonial slaves’ undermined its commitment to revolutionary goals and hamstrung its response to the economic crisis, fascism and war. At each outbreak of anti-colonial resistance during the next thirty years, it moved further from its original political stand. Although it mounted a militant campaign for amnesty and the independence of Vietnam after the short-lived but brutally suppressed Yen Bay Insurrection of February 1930, the PCF had the advantage of a strongly anti-colonial climate of opinion. The moderate left resented the colons of Indochina, who were considered corrupt and dissolute, was grateful to the Vietnamese for their contribution to the French war effort in the 1914–18 war, and was fascinated with the exotisme of Vietnamese culture. When Algerian nationalists pressed the Blum government for autonomy in 1936–37, however, Thorez accused L’Etoile Nord Africain and its leader,
Messali Hadj, of aiding the fascists to destroy the Popular Front. The PCF took to the streets to oppose the Indochina War only after the socialists expelled them from the government and never called for a fraternization or a general strike. During the Algerian War the PCF entirely abdicated its leading role in opposing colonialism. Even the protests against the widespread use of torture were initiated by a small group of leftist intellectuals and communist dissidents.  

To put the French left’s behaviour during the Rif War in perspective, it must be recognized that the PCF’s collective outlook was far less paternalistic than the optimistic, liberal attitude of French superiority espoused by the socialists, and the latter’s view contrasted markedly with the state of permanent inequality envisioned by more conservative elements of French society. Chauvinism, xenophobic nativism and anti-Semitism, as well as white racism, have generated loyalties that transcended class consciousness, subsumed class conflict and reinforced the dark side of French nationalism, putting the left on common political terrain with the right and corrupting demands for social justice and equality. As the tide of Asian and African nationalism rose, white supremacy grew; today it occupies a central place in the panoply of dark forces. The Rif War gave the PCF a historic opportunity to ‘go against the current’, to set an anti-imperialist precedent that challenged the European-dominated world order. But when the party rallied around Thorez’s programme in September 1925, the die was cast. The French communists had stared history in the face and blinked.

Notes

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National Pride of the Great Russians', *Collected Works*, v. 21 (12 December 1914); see also Marx on the Irish question: Marx to L. Kugelmann (29 November 1869) and Marx to S. Meyer and A. Vogt (9 April 1870) in Marx and Engels, *On Britain* (Moscow 1962), 547–53.


14. Robrieux, op. cit., I, 152–60 (1923 speech by Cachin on the Ruhr); Wohl, op. cit., 320–5; racism did raise its ugly head in the Ruhr, but in a different context. See
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17. JOC, 5 February 1925, 580–91.


19. Police reports, Notes ‘Jean’ (political commentary), 24 March 1925, AN F-7 12953 (on Paribas’ withdrawal of support from Herriot); anon., ‘Finaly, artisan de la victoire du 11 mai’, La Révolution prolétarienne (May 1926).


21. Police reports on the Morocco campaign, report on PCF politburo meeting, 29 May 1925, no. A4.589, AN F-7 13413; police reports, Seine, 28–30 May 1925, AN F-7 13174.


24. AN 313 AP, Papiers Painlevé, carton 248, 10 January 1926.


27. AN F-7 13413, nos. A.671, A4.747, A5.000, A5.126 (4, 6, 10, 13 June 1925).

28. Cachin’s speech in JOC, 9 July 1925, 3294–8; L’Humanité, 6, 10 June, 8 July 1925.

29. Robrieux, op. cit., I, 168: the PCF’s ideology was an ‘alloy of Jaurèsism, Guesdism, revolutionary syndicalism and Bolshevism in varying proportions’. The PCF did not translate and publish Lenin’s Imperialism until 1923–25: see Danielle Tartakowsky, ‘Les conditions de la pénétration du Marxisme en France’, Cahiers de l’Institut Maurice Thorez, o.s. no. 28, Sept/Oct 1972, 35; see also Wohl, 325, on Treint’s idea of ‘workers’ imperialism’.

30. JOC, 9 July 1925, 3290, 3292.


33. L’Humanité, 5, 10 July 1925; Comité Central d’action (ed.), ‘Contre la guerre du Maroc’, pamphlet (Paris 1925) (reprints all the speeches from the Congress except Doriot’s, which appeared in the 5 July 1925 issue of L’Humanité); Slavin, op. cit., 210–13.

34. J.-P. Brunet, op. cit., 90; Oved, op. cit., 232 (Oved’s source is Archives Institut Maurice Thorez, no. 93); Robrieux, op. cit., 90, note 32, does not report this story.

35. Philippe Robrieux, Maurice Thorez, Vie secrète et vie publique (Paris 1975), 88–91 (hereafter cited as Robrieux, Thorez); Henri Barbé, ‘Souvenirs d’un dirigeant et militant communiste’, unpublished ms. (n.d., Hoover Institution, Stanford CA), 85–92 (Barbé claims that in 1925 Thorez was a protégé of Doriot. Robrieux says he was a follower of Souvarine until his first trip to Moscow in February 1925. Robrieux’s conclusion is well-documented although he does not devote much space to Thorez’ role in the Rif War or mention the shift in Thorez’ position detailed below.)

36. Police reports, Moroccan campaign, Seine, 2 July 1925, AN F-7 13178; L’Humanité, 27, 30 June 1925 (open letters); L’Etincelle socialiste, 12, 19, 26 June 1925.

37. Oved, op. cit., 230, 599–601 (Oved’s source is Institut Maurice Thorez, série 91 et 93); J.-P. Brunet, op. cit., 60.

38. JOC, 29 May 1925, 2513–21.

39. JOC, 9 July 1925, 3314–18.


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52. Police reports, Seine, AN F-7 13178.

53. Police reports on general strike, reports on CGTU executive committee meetings, 9, 18, 24, 25 September, AN F-7 12919; police reports on trade union activity, CGTU executive committee meetings, 8, 26 September, AN F-7 13579; *La Vie Ouvrière*, 10 September 1925; *Le Travailleur de la métallurgie*, Aug., Sept. 1925; police reports, Indre-et-Loire, AN F-7 13176; police reports on metalworkers, Seine 16 September, Ivry 22 September, 1 October, AN F-7 13779; police reports Basses-Alpes, Alpes-Maritimes, AN F-7 13175.


55. André Marty, ‘Front unique. Conférence sténographique, 2 décembre 1925’, 6–8. André Marty Archives, Houghton Library, Harvard University. Marty claims he made this criticism in August as well as December, but ‘too timidly’ to have an effect.


57. Slavin, op. cit., 297–8, contrast Thorez speech on 5 July 1925.


59. Melvyn P. Leffler, *The Elusive Quest. America’s Pursuit of European Stability and French Security*, 1919–1933 (Chapel Hill, NC 1976); *Survey of International Affairs*, 2 vols (London 1925), II, 146–8; police reports on trade union activity, 8 September 1925, AN F-7 13579; police reports on general strike, 9 September 1925, CGTU executive committee meeting, AN F-7 12919; *La Vie Ouvrière*, 10 September 1925.

60. Police reports on general strike, PCF instructions to agitators, 10-page mimeograph, AN F-7 12919; police reports, notes ‘Jean’, 7 October, no. A 669, 8 October 1925, AN F-7 12953; *L’Humanité*, 30 September, 8 October 1925.

61. Police reports, general strike, AN F-7 12919; police reports, demonstrations, 1925, AN F-7 13313; police reports, trade union activity, 24 October (report on 23
October CGTU executive committee meeting), 20, 21 December 1925, AN F-7 13579; police reports, Indre et Loire, Gard, AN F-7 13176; police reports, metalworkers, 12 October, AN F-7 13779; police reports, miners, 12 October, AN F-7 13793 & 13794; Slavin, op. cit., 302, 295–321, 333–6.


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